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COMMENTS
The Dysfunctional
'Family Resemblance" Test:
After Reves v. Ernst & Young,
When are Mortgage Notes "Securities"?
JOHN C. CODYt
INTRODUCTION
This Comment discusses the Supreme Court's 1990 securities
law decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young' and its ramifications for
mortgage-related financial instruments and transactions. Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules prohibit fraud in the purchase or
sale of securities,' which the Securities Exchange Act defines to in-
clude "notes."' In Reves, the Supreme Court for the first time estab-
lished a specific test to determine the extent to which notes fit the
definition of "securities" under the Securities Acts. In so doing, the
Court adopted a modified "family resemblance" approach taken by
the Second Circuit.4
Mortgage notes "evidenc[e] a loan for which real estate has
been offered as a security."5 They are issued in real estate transac-
tions as simple as single-family residence purchases and as complex
as multi-million dollar commercial development projects. Back in
the "good old days," when a family purchased a home, the family's
t J.D., 1994, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. The author
thanks Professor Stephanie Phillips for her comments and encouragement, John O'Hara,
Esq., for suggesting the topic, and Alisa Lukasiewicz and Kevin Szczepanski for their edi-
torial efforts.
1. 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (holding that a note must be presumed to be a "security" as
defined in both the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act unless it
bears a strong family resemblance to an item on a list of approved exceptions). See dis-
cussion infra part III.
2. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). A note is a written promise to pay someone money
at a future date. See 11 AM. JUR. 2D Bills and Notes § 21 (1963).
4. Previously, the Court had created tests for instruments cited in the securities
laws as investment contracts and stock. The Court did not create a test for notes until its
decision in Reves. See, respectively, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), and
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990).
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promise to the bank to pay back its loan was secured by the pur-
chased property and generally stayed with the bank. In recent years,
such promises, or mortgage notes, increasingly have been packaged
and sold by banks and traded in a secondary mortgage market.
Often their issuers, the SEC or the courts have denoted the repack-
aged instruments mortgage-backed "securities." The Court in Reves
held that a "note secured by a mortgage on a home" does not meet
the Security Exchange Act's definition of "security." Thus Reves
made unavailable federal securities law protection to those claiming
fraud in such a purchase or sale.
However, the questions remain, what is a "note secured by a
mortgage on a home" and of what significance is the pooling and re-
packaging into ever more complex instruments? The courts have in-
consistently answered these questions.
Since a myriad of real estate-related financial instruments and
transactions are implicated in the federal securities regulatory con-
text,6 this Comment does not purport to be wholly comprehensive.
Instead, its primary focus is upon what is commonly refered to as
the "secondary mortgage market." The significance of this market
can be traced to its phenomenal growth in recent years,7 the vast
losses that the savings and loan industry incurred as its member
6. The federal government also has attempted in myriad ways to extend home
ownership to low and moderate-income Americans. See, e.g., Tim Vettel, Donnelly and Ri-
egle Propose Four-Year Extension for Mortgage Revenue Bonds, TAX NOTES, July 6, 1987,
at 24, 25. Mortgage Revenue Bonds (MRBs) are tax-exempt instruments distributed to
the states by the federal government and then sold to investors. The proceeds are used as
subsidies to allow low-interest rate loans to homebuyers. Mortgage Credit Certificates
(MCCs) entitle low and moderate-income homebuyers to a "nonrefundable income tax
credit of 10 to 50 percent of the interest paid on qualified mortgage loans to finance the
acquisition or rehabilitation of an individual's principal residence." Id. This Comment is
concerned with government assistance to homebuyers through its guarantees in what is
traditionally referred to as the "secondary mortgage market," rather than through the
federal tax system. Surprisingly, there has been a dearth of commentary and research in
this area, despite one practitioner's comment that securities lawyers "have some studying
ahead" if they want to understand new mortgage-backed securities. Francis X. Sulger,
Esq., quoted in Kim Masters, Mortgage-Securities Weddings to Boom, LEGAL TIMES, June
20, 1983, at 1, 8.
7. "Today the mortgage-backed securities market is second only in size to the U.S.
Treasury market. It outperformed all other fixed income securities from 1981 through
1991 .... " Marcia Parker, Hyperion's Sun is Rising Again; Ranieri Revives With New
Team, CRAIN'S N.Y. BUS., Nov. 30, 1992, at 1.
The title of Ms. Parker's article refers to Lewis Ranieri, the anti-hero of LIAR'S
POKER, Michael Lewis' non-fiction account of 1980s mortgage-backed securities trading.
Ranieri, the former Salomon Brothers Vice Chairman, who is often credited with single-
handedly creating the mortgage-backed security market, now is running his own firm,
Hyperion Capital Management, Inc., which specializes in mortgage-backed instruments.
See MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER (1989).
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banks (S&Ls) traded in these types of investments,8 and the continu-
ing extension of asset-backed securitization to instruments other
than mortgages.9
Part I of this Comment provides an introduction to mortgages
and the various types of mortgage-related financial instruments in
existence today and examines the explosive growth of mortgages in
the financial market. Part 11 discusses the federal regulatory scheme
as it pertains to the fraudulent sale or purchase of securities, and
the ongoing quest of the federal courts to define securities. Part Im
examines the Reves decision, and Part IV assesses its impact on
mortgage/security case law to date. Finally, Part V discusses why
the "family resemblance" test for notes fails in the mortgage realm.
This Comment concludes that the Supreme Court must clarify
whether the "family resemblance" test provides plaintiffs with a fed-
eral fraud remedy in note cases, and urges the Court to explain in a
future mortgage note case precisely how the test is to be employed.
I. WHAT ARE MORTGAGE NoTEs?
A. The Primary and Secondary Mortgage Markets
The idea of using land as security for a borrower's promise can
be traced back at least five thousand years to the Babylonians. 10 Old
Germanic law referred to the practice as a gage, with the French
word mort, for "dead" or "frozen," being added later to signify a
locked pledge on property. Hence, we now refer to a lien on real
property enforceable upon nonperformance of the borrower as a
"mortgage.""
A potential homeowner desiring funds to purchase applies for a
loan from a mortgage originator. The lender evaluates the risks in
terms of the applicant's ability to pay (payment-to-income ratio, or
"PTI)') and the value of the property (loan-to-value ratio, or
8. More than seven hundred thrifts (savings and loans) collapsed in the late 1980s
and early 1990s at an expected cost to taxpayers of $220 billion. Kenneth H. Bacon, Ernst
Agrees to Pay U.S. $400 Million, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1992, at A3. For a discussion of
how the thrift collapse relates to the secondary mortgage market, see infra part I.B.
9. Asset-backed securitization has been extended to everything from car loans,
credit card receivables, and aircraft and boat leases. See Suzanne Woolley & Stan Crock,
You Can Securitize Virtually Anything, BUS. WK., July 20, 1992, at 78. For a fuller dis-
cussion, see infra part I.C.
10. WILLII BARTLETT, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: PRODUCTS, ANALYSIS,
TRADING 3 (1989).
11. Id. at 4; see also 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages §§ 1-9 (1971).
12. The PTI is the ratio of monthly payments to monthly income. See FRANK J.
FABozzI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
MARKETS 41-42 (1992) [hereinafter FABOZZI & MODIGLIANI].
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"LTV"). 13 If the application is approved, the lender is responsible for
loaning funds according to the agreed terms in a commitment letter.
When the mortgage loan closes, the lender holds a mortgage note in
which the borrower agrees to repay the loan with the real estate
serving as security.'4 After the loan is closed, the originator has
three choices as to what it can do with the individual mortgage: (1)
hold it in its portfolio as an investment; (2) sell it in the secondary
market; or (3) warehouse it prefatory to its aggregation with other
such loans and their eventual sale or securitization.'5
The primary and secondary mortgage markets are interrelated:
a strong secondary market provides funding for primary mortgage
loans, and a strong primary market provides loans which may be
packaged and securitized. 16 The secondary market consists almost
entirely of single-family mortgage loans which are resold. Mortgages
backed by multifamily houses and commercial real estate comprise a
small part of the secondary market. 17
The phrase "secondary mortgage market" refers specifically to
any sale of mortgages originated in the primary market. 18 However,
with the explosive growth of mortgage-backed securities, the phrase
has come to be commonly understood to refer to repackaged
"mortgage-backeds" alone.' 9 Real estate markets are both unique
and inefficient. 0 Secondary mortgage markets attempt to combat
13. The LTV is the ratio of the amount of the loan to the assessed value of the
property. Id. at 42.
14. For a description of the general mortgage origination process, see id. at 41-44.
15. Id at44.
16. Id.
17. Id. Forty percent of the $2.74 trillion single family mortgage debt outstanding in
1991 had been securitized, compared with only ten percent of multi-family mortgage debt.
This is because multi-family dwellings and commercial properties tend to be unique and
their mortgages are not as readily packagable. Id. at 24.
18. JoAnne Bradner, Comment, The Secondary Mortgage Market and State Regula.
tion of Real Estate Financing, 36 EmORY L.J. 971, 973 (1987).
19. Id. at 974. Laypeople sometimes confuse the phrase "secondary mortgage mar-
ket" with the practice of securing a second mortgage on a home or other real estate. "The
phrase 'secondary mortgage market,' as used today, suffers from imprecision." Id. at 973.
"Secondary mortgage" refers to a lender's re-sale of the first, primary mortgage, not to an
individual's securing of a second mortgage in addition to the primary one, whether from
the original lender or another. It is estimated that as of 1991, only $2 billion of second
mortgages have been securitized. FABOZZI & MODIGLIAM, supra note 12, at 324.
20. Peter Chinloy explained:
Underlying all real estate markets are the basic and possibly unique character-
istics of land. Since real estate markets are shown to be relatively inefficient,
the efficient markets theories from other areas in finance may not be completely
appropriate. Under efficient markets, one cannot obtain a superior-to-average
return, except by accident.... Compared with financial markets as a whole,
real estate physical and financial markets are relatively inefficient.... The
presence of the inefficiency is what leads to potential profit making, and corre-
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this inefficiency and to reduce the inherent risks associated with
real estate investment.2 Mortgage-backed securities, packaged so as
to defeat these risks, are the major component of the secondary
mortgage market. They are one of the most significant developments
in real estate finance in this century.22
1. Public Issuance of Mortgage-Backed Securities. Just as the
modem securities laws arose from the economic travails of the Great
Depression of the 1930s, the secondary mortgage market was cre-
ated in response to that era's depressed housing market.23 The Na-
tional Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Admini-
sponding loss making, opportunities. With financial assets, each unit is ho-
mogenous. With real estate physical assets, there are differences in character-
istics. Even with [real estate] financial assets, such as mortgage backed securi-
ties, there are differences between similar assets, because of the heterogeneity
in the underlying borrowers and properties.
PETER CINLOY, REAL ESTATE: INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL STRATEGY 7-8 (1988). Real
estate's heterogeneity can be traced to differences in local zoning laws, building codes,
environmental regulations and rent controls, as well as its own basic non-portability and
finite supply. Id. at 8-14.
21. Some of these risks include interest rate risk and refinancing risk. Interest rate
risk on mortgages arises as a result of the inverse relationship between asset prices and
interest rates. In other words, as interest rates rise, mortgage lenders are at risk of capi-
tal loss because their lendable funds are locked in at a lower rate than the one prevailing
at a time when prices inflate. This is especially true in the case of the usual fixed rate,
long term mortgage. Id. at 211-12.
Refinancing risk occurs because borrowers respond to declining interest rates by re-
financing their mortgages at the lower rate, thus reducing the yield and return to the
mortgage lender. The secondary mortgage market allows the lender to unload inherently
risky real estate loans from its portfolio, and to receive in return funds with which to
make additional loans. Id. at 212.
22. As Christopher Farrell states:
For better or worse, the mortgage-backed security may be the supreme postwar
financial innovation on Wall Street. The traditional fixed-rate, 30-year mort-
gage is essentially a stream of monthy payments. By pooling a group of similar
mortgages, investment bankers can sell slices of that stable cash flow to inves-
tors, who provide fresh funds for still more mortgage lending.
Christopher Farrell, How Wall Street is Driving the Mortgage Market, Bus. WK., May 4,
1987, at 108.
It has helped minimize the problem caused by the fact that savings and loan as-
sociations (S&Ls), the historic providers of [mortgage] funds, are less able to
supply the needs of homebuyers due to problems caused by competition for de-
posits, the deregulation of the federal depository system, and the danger of ris-
ing interest rates.
Patricia Prim Biller, The Significance of Income Taxation for Securitized Mortgages and
the Secondary Mortgage Market, 9 AM. J. TAX POLVY 283, 284 (1991). Indeed, many aca-
demics believe S&Ls have grown obsolete and will be replaced by quasi-federal govern-
ment origination of mortgages. See MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY
283 (1990) [hereinafter MAYER, BANK ROBBERY].
23. Bradner, supra note 18, at 973.
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stration,2 which in turn originated the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA), colloquially known today by the moniker
"Fannie Mae."
The FNMA was authorized to buy, sell or trade in mortgages
insured or guaranteed by the federal government through the Fed-
eral Housing Administration or the Veterans' Administration (VA),
in order to:
establish secondary market facilities for residential mortgages, to provide
that the operations thereof shall be financed by private capital to the
maximum extent feasible, and to authorize such facilities to provide sta-
bility in the secondary market for residential mortgages by providing a
degree of liquidity for mortgage investments, thereby improving the dis-
tribution of investment capital available for home mortgage financ-
ing .... 
25
As a result of the congressional enactment of Title VIII of the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,26 FNMA was spun off
into a federally-sponsored private corporation, which buys mort-
gages from banks, thrifts, insurance companies and mortgage
banking companiesv pools them, and sells securities issued in its
own name backed by these mortgage pools. 28 FNMA purchases both
conventional, i.e. nonguaranteed, and government-guaranteed mort-
gages, and issues a standard security based on a 30-year loan term
but assuming prepayment after 12 years.29 FNMA guarantees timely
payment of principal and interest. However, this guarantee is not
backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government.30
The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), col-
loquially known as "Ginnie Mae," was created in 1968 by the Housing
and Urban Development Act as a wholly owned corporation of the
federal government, administered by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). 31 GNMA pools mortgages issued by
24. National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, § 1, 48 Stat. 1246 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1702 (1988)).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (1988), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1994).
26. Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476, 536
(1968) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716b-1723h (1988)).
27. "Mortgage banking companies are nondepositary institutions providing funds for
mortgages. These firms attract funds from institutional investors, such as insurance
companies, pension funds, and... payments by other borrowers on existing loans."
CHINLOY, supra note 20, at 306-07.
28. Id. at 214-15.
29. Id. at 215. Yields, then, are calculated on a 30-year amortization schedule. This
allows for the assumption that the borrower will prepay the loan after 12 years, and pay a
small annual servicing fee to the original lender.
30. Mortgage-Backed Securities, H1 Tax Transactions Libr. (CCH) 1 14.03 (1993)
[hereinafter Mortgage-Backed Securities].
31. CHINLOY, supra note 20, at 216.
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the FHA, VA, or the Farmers' Home Administration, and insures
and guarantees the securities it issues as to timely payment of in-
terest and principal backed by the full faith and credit of the federal
government.2 GNMA issues both standard "pass-through" securi-
ties, through which both principal and interest payments are
"passed through" monthly or quarterly to the certificate holder, and
mortgage-backed bonds.3 GNMA also re-sells some whole mortgages
itself.3 4
Title III of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 created
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), colloqui-
ally known as "Freddie Mac." 5 FHLMC was created to establish a
secondary market for conventional, i.e. non-government guaranteed
or insured, mortgage loans.36 This federally sponsored private corpo-
ration, directed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB),
buys mortgages from depository institutions and mortgage bankers
and issues securities in either bond or pass-through form. FHLMC,
like FNMA, guarantees timely interest and principal payments.
However, FHLMC securities are not backed by the full faith and
credit of the government."
Behind the burgeoning mortgage-backed securities market are
these three governmental and quasi-governmental entities affec-
tionately known as Fannie, Ginnie, and Freddie. 9 The federal gov-
ernment's backing enticed investors previously worried about real
estate related risk to enter the mortgage market." Although GNMA
32. Id. These are the only securities besides U.S. Treasuries and EE Savings Bonds
that carry the full faith and credit guarantee. Nancy Dunnan, Mortgage-Backed Securi-
ties, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 108.
33. Id. These include: sinking fund bonds, for which principal is paid in fixed
amounts; and staggered maturity bonds, for which interest and principal are paid regard-
less of mortgage payments made.
34. CHINLOY, supra note 20, at 216.
35. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 457 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-59 (1988)). Its Congressional mandate was to create a liquid secon-
dary market in residential mortgages; see Proposed Rule 3a12-4 Defining Whole Loan
Mortgages as Exempted Securities for Purposes of Subsections (a) and (c)(3) of Section 15;
Rescision of Rule 15a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-10551 (1973 WL 19607).
36. Bradner, supra note 18, at 978.
37. CHINLOY, supra note 20, at 213.
38. Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 30, at 1 14.02.
39. This government policy was effective. Between the 1930s and 1987, the percent-
age of American families owning their own home increased from 44% to 66%. WILLIAM
GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE 43 (1987). For a clear description of public secondary
mortgage market instruments and procedures, see GEORGE M. BOLLENBACHER, THE
PROFESSIONAL's GUIDE To THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIEs MARKETS 90-109 (1988),
and for a description of the governmental policies implicated therein, see ANTHONY
DOWNS, THE REVOLUTION IN REAL ESTATE FINANCE 234-62 (1985).
40. Bradner, supra note 18, at 978.
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is backed to the extent of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, standard
mortgage-backed securities "are guaranteed only against default
risk, and not against either interest rate or refinancing risk."41 Thus,
the efforts of mortgage-security brokers in recent years have been
directed towards reducing these remaining risks by packaging mort-
gage-related instruments in ever more clever risk-reducing ways.42
2. Private Issuance of Mortgage-Backed Securities. The Secon-
dary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 (SMMEA) was en-
acted by Congress to enhance nongovernmental, private issuances of
mortgage securities at the expense of the government monopoly.
43 It
amends the securities acts to, inter alia, lessen registration re-
41. CHINLOY, supra note 20, at 7. The author notes that the former interest rate risk
is shared by other popular instruments, such as Treasury bonds, while refinancing risk is
unique to mortgage instruments. See infra part I.C. for a discussion of the burgeoning
popularity of asset-backed securities, including credit card receivables, boat and other
personal property loan re-packaging. These also are susceptible to refinancing risk unless
packaged to safeguard against it.
42. The disincentives for investing in mortgage instruments without these risk-re-
ducing factors have been characterized in the following way:
First, mortgages have historically paid both interest and principal monthly,
whereas government and corporate bonds pay interest semiannually and all
principal at maturity. Since the investor must reinvest principal and interest
income more frequently, transaction costs and interest rate risk are greater for
mortgages ....
Second, the cash flow and maturity of a mortgage are deemed more uncer-
tain because the borrower can supplement the required monthly payments, or
repay the entire loan, or default at any time. Investors, therefore, have diffi-
culty determining the maturity and expected yield on the mortgage....
A third disadvantage of investing in whole mortgages in the commercial
property market (and to a lesser extent in the residential property market) is
that they are not homogenous commodities... and are, therefore, less market-
able than conventional securities....
Finally, servicing and originating mortgages entail substantial adminis-
trative costs per dollar of investment.
David Alan Richards, "Gradable and Tradable": The Securitization of Commercial Real
Estate Mortgages, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 100-01 (1987). Examples of the many ways in
which mortgage securities have been structured to reduce these risks and problems are
found infra part I.B.
43. Bradner, supra note 18, at 980. In 1982, "[olf the estimated $250 billion secon-
dary mortgage market, only about $5 billion [was] in privately insured mortgage securi-
ties." Andrew Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives in the Mortgage-Backed Se-
curity Market, 18 REAL PROP., PROB. AND TiR. J. 426, 431 (1983) (quoting WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 1982, at B33). Estimates of the need for housing funds in the ten years after
1982 ranged up to $4 trillion. Id. See David Abelman, The Secondary Mortgage Market
Enhancement Act, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 136 (1985).
By 1987, almost half the total securitized market consisted of GinnieMae MBSs
($320 billion). A similar number were FannieMaes and FreddieMacs ($370 billion); and,
only a small percentage of the market consisted of privately issued MBSs ($19 billion).
BARTLET, supra note 10, at 56.
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quirements for private issuers." SMMEA was enacted to forestall a
shortage of mortgage funds given projected increasing demand.4 5
The "ultimate goal was to facilitate private sector participation in
the secondary market for mortgages."46
SMMEA defines privately issued "mortgage-related securities"
as such:
(1) The security is rated in one of the two highest rating categories by
at least one nationally recognized statistical rating organization; 47 and
(2) The security must either represent ownership of one or more prom-
issory notes or certificates of interest or participations in such notes; or be
secured by one or more promissory notes or certificates of interest or par-
ticipation in such notes and, by its terms, provide for payments of princi-
pal in relation to payments or reasonable projections of payments, on
notes, or certificates of interest or participations, in promissory notes; and
(3) The underlying notes or certificates must be directly secured by a
first lien on a single parcel of real estate; stock allocated to a dwelling unit
in a residential cooperative housing corporation, upon which is located a
dwelling or mixed residential and commercial structure; or on a residen-
44. Id.; see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(41)(A)(ii) (1988).
The Act also amends the Federal Credit Union Act so as to allow federal credit unions to
invest in privately issued mortgages and mortgage securities. See Federal Credit Union
Investment in Mortgage Securities, 52 Fed. Reg. 27,994-01 (1987) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. ch. VII).
Unlike private issuances, mortgage-backed securities issued by the quasi-govern-
mental agencies (Fannie, Freddie, etc.) are exempt from SEC registration requirements.
FABOZZI & MODIGLIANI, supra note 12, at 33.
45. S. REP. NO. 293, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2809-10.
46. Mortgage Related Securities, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,292-01 (1987) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 220). Two commentators argue that the SMMEA did little to foster its goal of
increased private issuance of mortgage securities, and is best noted for its creation of
Section 3(a)(41) within the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988), which
defined "mortgage-related securities." A private mortgage-backed instrument must be
structured according to this definition in order to qualify for shelf registration under Rule
415, exemption from the Investment Company Act of 1940, and exemption from the pre-
emption of federal securities laws by state blue sky laws. To date, four states, Arkansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota and New Mexico, have overridden the federal preemption of their
laws, as allowed under SMMEA. Mark W. Grobmeyer & Marva K. Garrett, Securitizing
Financial Assets, 22 ARK. LAW., Oct. 1988, at 222, 224-25.
47. Examples of statistical rating organizations include Standard & Poor's and
Moody's. Their two highest rating categories are: Standard & Poor's, AAA or AA+, AA,
and AA-; Moody's, Aaa or Aal, Aa2, and Aa3.
The rating companies do intensive analyses of mortgage pools, rating their quality
based upon: lien status; types of property; occupancy status; amortization type; mortgage
term; age of the mortgage; location and geographic dispersion of mortgages; size of mort-
gages; loan to value ratios; size of the pool; mortgage default insurance; pool insurance;
and degree of over-collateralization. Federal Credit Union Investment in Mortgage Secu-
rities, 52 Fed. Reg. 27,994-01 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. VII).
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tial manufactured home; and
(4) The underlying notes or certificates must have been originated by a
savings and loan association, savings bank, commercial bank, credit un-
ion, insurance company, or similar institution which is supervised and ex-
amined by a Federal or State authority; or by a mortgagee approved by
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
48
The Bank of America initiated private issuance of mortgage se-
curities in 1977 with the placement of $150 million of pass-through
certificates.49 Other financial institutions followed suit.50 Between
1984 and 1988, the total amount of annually privately issued mort-
gage securities increased from $10 billion to more than $71 billion.'
However, the largest participants in the secondary mortgage market
remained the government-related entities: Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae,
and Freddie Mac.52 This was because government-issues retain some
advantages over private issues: (1) instruments issued by each of the
three entities are exempt from Securities Acts registration require-
ments; (2) these issues are considered less risky than private issues
because they are either backed by the full faith and credit of the fed-
eral government (GNMA) or the government guarantees payment
(FNMA and FHLMC);53 and (3) until recently private issues were
unrated by bond rating agencies,54 making them less palatable to in-
vestors.55
B. Growth of the Secondary Mortgage and Other Asset-Backed
Markets
1. Increase in Volume. The growth of the secondary mortgage
market in recent years has been phenomenal. A former bond trader
for Salomon Brothers, in a notable insider's financial history of the
bond market of the 1980s,6 traced the explosion of the market to an
48. Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(41) (1988).
49. Bradner, supra note 18, at 979. The instruments, according to one insider, were
legal at the time they were issued in only three states. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 100-01.
50. For example, Norwest issued $300 million of certificates representing interests
in three mortgage pools, each pool containing a different kind of mortgage loan. Masters,
supra note 6, at 1, 8.
51. Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affecting Mortgage
Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAMiE L. REv. 497, 497 (1989).
52. Bradner, supra note 18, at 980.
53. Private issues require private insurance and the resulting costs, because, unless
issued through the intermediation of the government agencies, they lack government
guarantees. See Sears Family Studies Pooling of Mortgages to Create New Product, SEC.
WK., Feb. 21, 1983, at 8.
54. For examples of statistical rating organization, see supra note 47.
55. Bradner, supra note 18, at 980.
56. LEWIS, supra note 7.
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incident occurring on a particular day in 1979. On October 6th of
that year, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker announced that
the money supply would be fixed, and interest rates allowed to
float. 57 If interest rates swing wildly, then bond prices do, too, in-
versely. After Volcker's speech, bonds for the first time became ob-
jects of speculation.58
Whether or not that was actually the precipitating event,59 it is
true that in the 1980s American governments, consumers, and cor-
porations borrowed more money than ever before. Their combined
indebtedness in 1977 (mostly in loans made by commercial banks)
was $323 billion. By 1985, the indebtedness had grown to $7
trillion.60 A greater percentage of that debt was in bonds,61 as out-
standing mortgage loans grew from $55 billion in 1950 to $1.2 tril-
lion in 1980, the mortgage market surpassing the combined United
States stock markets as the largest capital market in the world.62
Between 1977 and 1986, the holdings of mortgage bonds by Ameri-
can thrifts grew from $12.6 billion to $150 billion. 3
57. Id. at 35; GREIDER, supra note 39, at 124-25.
58. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 35. Bonds are usually long-term debt instruments, com-
monly secured by mortgages as differentiated from stock, which is an equity representing
an ownership interest. See BLACK's LAW DIcTioNARY 178, 1415 (6th ed. 1990). Michael
Lewis points out that after Volcker's speech, short-term interest rates skyrocketed and
new housing starts dropped to post-war lows. In 1980, there were 4,002 S&L's in Amer-
ica. Within three years, 962 of those had collapsed. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 100.
59. Lewis also points to September 30, 1981, when Congress passed a tax break al-
lowing thrifts to receive previously-paid tax dollars back from the federal government if
they could show losses on their books. The S&Ls eagerly sold the bad loans on their books
at a loss. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 103-04. Not to sell would have been to risk bankruptcy,
since the thrifts were paying out 14% interest rates on deposits while taking in 5% rates
on old mortgage loans. By late 1982, short-term rates declined below long-term interest
rates, so the thrifts could make new mortgage loans at 14% while taking in money for
which they paid just 12%. Id. at 106.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id. Between 1977 and 1986 the holdings of mortgage bonds by American Savings
and Leans grew from $12.6 billion to $150 billion. Despite their dwindling numbers, S&Ls
as a group nearly doubled in asset size, from $650 billion in 1981 to $1.2 trillion in 1986.
Id. at 114.
62. Id. at 83. Lewis also states:
The U.S. mortgage market is now [in 1989] the largest credit market in the
world and may one day be the single largest bond market in the world. [This
signals] a shift in the focus of Wall Street. Wall Street, historically, had dealt
with only one side of the balance sheet: liabilities. Mortgages are assets. If home
mortgages could be packaged and sold, so could credit card receivables, car
loans, and any other kind of loan you can imagine.
Id. at 149. For a discussion regarding the accuracy of Lewis' predictions, see infra part
I.C.2.
63. Id at 114. The Resolution Trust Corp., formed in order to salvage the assets of
S&Ls that failed after real estate and other values crashed, is itself selling billions of
dollars worth of mortgage-backed securities, dubbed "Ritzy Maes" by financial pundits.
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Sales of mortgage related securities continued to set records
during the early 1990s economic recession-a time of falling yields
on real estate investments.64 Issuance of REMICs and CMOs alone
totaled $180 billion in 1991, surpassing 1990's record of $110 bil-
lion.6 5 The sales of non-mortgage asset-backed securities also con-
tinue to set new records, as banks and other financial institutions
"use securitization to lower their financing costs, increase liquidity
or improve their balance sheets."66
2. Extension of Securitization to New Areas. As mentioned pre-
viously, the notion of pooling mortgages and packaging them in
various forms for sale as mortgage-related securities has been ex-
tended to other types of assets, giving rise generally to the category
"asset-backed securities." The emergence of hybridized and inven-
tive new packages has led to concern that "today's financial markets
may require a fundamental reconsideration of the nature of 'assets'
and 'liabilities' .... 6 ' For example, Merrill Lynch issued $140 mil-
lion worth of 30-day commercial paper, backed by credit card receiv-
ables in June 1985. However, most asset-backed issuances are more
straightforward than the hybrids."
See Thomas Paulette, Mortgage-Backed 'Ritzy Maes' Stroll Down the Street With RTC,
WALL ST. J., July 12, 1991, at C1.
64. REMICS, CMOS, Asset-Backed Securities Set New Volume Records, PSA Says,
SEC. WY, Dec. 23, 1991, at 8. Mortgage pass-through issuance is being driven by the
numbers of homeowners refinancing their mortgages in a time of falling interest rates. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Asset-backed securities set a new record in 1991-at least $44 billion of
issuance. Credit card securitization was down slightly from $20.4 billion in 1990 to $18
billion in 1991, after Congress threatened to cap consumer credit card interest rates.
However, car loan and home equity asset-backeds increased in volume dramatically. Id.
See also Michael Siconolfi, Securities Backed by Mortgages, Assets Show Signs of Slowing
After 1980s Surge, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1991, at Cl. This title was proven wrong, at least
as it regarded mortgage-backeds, after an "avalanche" of mortgage security sales set a
new record in the first quarter of 1992, representing 47% of all stock and bond underwrit-
ing in that quarter. Id.
67. Jeffery A. Lipkin, New Method of Raising Cash: Accounts Receivable Financing
is Entering Securities Markets, NATL. L. J., Feb. 17, 1986, at 18. Certainly, off-balance
sheet accounting considerations have aided the growth of this market. See, e.g., Richard
A. Massman, Current Trends in Asset Backed Financing, 13 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE
MATERIAIS J. 91-92 (1989).
68. An example of a typical asset-based transaction, one which, despite its normalcy
still raises troubling financial questions, is the issuance of $103 million of certificates for
automobile receivables by the Home Federal Savings and Loan Association on August 1,
1985. The certificates represented fractional undivided interests in a trust formed from a
pool of motor vehicle installment loans, the motor vehicles themselves securing the loans.
The certificates for this private placement were registered with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, so the issue as to whether the
certificates were securities did not arise, but difficult tax and Uniform Commercial Code
questions did. For information regarding the taxation of mortgage related securities, see
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Receivables financing has been used in the past to raise cash
for troubled companies, to maintain lines of working capital from
banks, and to raise funds for captive automobile finance compa-
nies.69 Its increasing use today has raised questions regarding the
economic impact on shareholders of selling entities. Critics contend
that managements are selling off their corporations' most desirable
assets to avoid raising capital, and inefficiently allocating re-
sources.
70
In addition to mortgages, assets which have been securitized to
date include: automobile loans, credit card receivables, boat loans,
computer and photocopier leases, aircraft and railcar leases, small
business loans, hospital and trade receivables, and home equity
loans.7' The SEC has expressed its support for expanding the asset-
backed market. Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden stated that
he would like to see small business loans securitized as a way to
lessen the effects of the credit "crunch" and a means to divert more
funding to small businesses.72
Another significant area to which asset-based securitization
has been extended is commercial real estate. Commercial Mortgage
Backed Bonds (CMBBs) were first issued in a $200 million offering
by Olympia & York Maiden Lane Finance Corp. in 1985. 73 Rental in-
come from a large office building is packaged to create an interest
Mary Martell, Taxation of the Mortgage Pool, 11 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 347 (1984); Gary Sil-
versmith, Mortgage-Backed Securities and the Secondary Mortgage Market: An Introduc-
tion, 2 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 188 (1986) [hereinafter Silversmith, Secondary Mortgage
Market]; Philip J. Weisner, Taxable Mortgage Pool Rules Now in Effect, TAX ADVISER,
June 1992, at 359.
Since the vehicles themselves secured the automobile installment loans in the Home
Federal issuance, the perfection of security interests under the UCC was implicated. For
example, if the owner of a vehicle had moved to another state, re-registration procedures
might have defeated the perfection of a security interest in the vehicle. Lipkin, supra note
67, at 18. Thus, while the non-portability of real estate poses certain problems in the
mortgage-backed financial sphere, portability can defeat risk-reducing precautions for
other asset-backeds. For a discussion of UCC problems with mortgage-backed securities,
see William H. Jennings, Problems in Buying and Selling Mortgage Loans: The $3 Tril-
lion Ambiguity, 19 UCC L.J. 255 (1987) [hereinafter Jennings, Problems].
69. Lipkin, supra note 67, at 18.
70. Id. at 19.
71. Woolley & Crock, supra note 9, at 78. By 1988, the total of all asset-backed se-
curitization had reached almost $30 billion. BARTLEIT, supra note 10, at 44.
72. Woolley & Crock, supra note 9, at 79. See also Sandra Block, SEC May Ease As-
set-Backed Securities Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1992, at C21. Critics contend that un-
sophisticated investors may purchase asset-backed bonds without a full understanding of
the risks and thus expose themselves to riskier-than-normal investments, because a
sharp economic downturn may cause widespread defaults on the loans securing the inves-
tor offerings. Id.
73. Securitizing Commercial Real Estate, STANDARD & POOR'S CREDIT WK_, Feb. 24,
1986, at 13.
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payment stream with the property itself serving as security. The of-
feror benefits by receiving less costly funding than if it had to bor-
row from private sources, and the purchaser benefits from relatively
high bond yields.
Commercial real estate securities dwarf any others in terms of
potential size.74 To date, however, they have not met that potential
because of problems peculiar to these types of offerings. For one
thing, commercial property is so heterogeneous as to make residen-
tial real property appear homogenous. 75 Commercial real estate ob-
tains its value from individual markets, leases, and changes in sup-
ply and demand which can vary region by region and even block by
block.7s Such heterogeneous mortgages are more difficult to pool, and
virtually always secure nonrecourse obligations. That is, there is no
recourse to the borrower's credit, only to the mortgaged asset, which
may have become devalued. 77 While the Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC) has been successful in placing a few billion dollars worth
of performing commercial real estate backed offerings, for the most
part this area of asset-backeds has not expanded because the risks
to investors are still seen as outweighing the potential benefits.78
3. Implications of the Growth of the Markets. The federal secu-
rities laws are, in essence, information-transfer devices; they seek to
provide to the investor disclosure of information necessary to make
reasoned investing decisions.79 Mortgage-securities instruments and
74. Id.
The estimated size of the commercial real estate mortgage market is said to be
upwards of $650 billion, roughly the same as the outstanding U.S. corporate
debt, and a figure which makes even the $350 billion in residential mortgage se-
curities pale in comparison.... There is reportedly a total of $2.5 trillion in
commercial real estate value in the United States, of which $1.8 trillion is eq-
uity.
Richards, supra note 42, at 112.
75. Richards, supra note 42, at 111.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Woolley & Crock, supra note 9, at 79. Investors are uncomfortable with the risks
and, as a result, demand in return yields so high that the deals become uneconomical.
79. Regarding the Securities Act of 1933, the Senate declared:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business.
The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securi-
ties to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing pro-
tection against fraud and misrepresentation.
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of un-
sound, fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation, to place
adequate and true information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise,
seeking capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dis-
honest securities offered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to
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transactions are especially complex, requiring perhaps a higher de-
gree of investor disclosures ° Congress, in its passage of the Secon-
dary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, considered even
those institutions engaged in these types of transactions as part of
their normal business practices in need of special protection:
... [T]he Committee was of the view that small banks, thrifts and credit
unions lacking in financial expertise should be provided additional pro-
tection against risky purchases. Accordingly,... the bill requires the ap-
propriate regulators to consider this question and provide regulations
where necessary governing the size and determination of the purchases
that are authorized. In this way, the bill endeavors to protect the liquidity
of less financially sophisticated institutions on whom many of our citizens
rely for the protection of their savings.
8
'
bring into productive channels of industry and development capital which has
grown timid to the point of hoarding;, and to aid in providing employment and
restoring buying and consuming power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st. Sess. 1 (1933), reprinted in MARc I. STEINBERG, CON-
TEMPORARY ISSUES IN SEcURITIEs REGULATION 7 (1988) [hereinafter STEINBERG,
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES].
The House Report for the same legislation also focused upon the information gap be-
tween investors and dealers in securities:
During the post-war [World War I] decade some 50 billions of new securities
were floated in the United States. Fully half or $25,000,000,000 worth of secu-
rities floated during this period have been proved to be worthless. These cold
figures spell tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their
life savings, accumulated after years of effort, in these worthless securities. The
flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was made possible
because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers in se-
curities of those standards of fair, honest and prudent dealing that should be
basic to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise. Alluring promises
of vast wealth were freely made with little or no attempt to bring to the inves-
tor's attention those facts essential to estimating the worth of any security.
High-pressure salesmanship rather than careful counsel was the rule in this
most dangerous of enterprises.
H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1933) reprinted in HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL &
SAMUEL E. WING, SECURITIEs LAW § 1.01[1] (1973).
80. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 118-19 ("M]ortgages were acknowledged to be the most
mathematically complex securities in the marketplace. The complexity arose entirely out
of the option the homeowner has to prepay his loan ... ."). Compare BARTLETr, supra
note 10, at 56 (contending that despite the complexities of many of the instruments de-
rived from mortgages, the fact that the single-family home mortgage underlies all of the
mortgage security cash flows reduces their complexities). Bartlett suggests that to under-
stand mortgage cash flows, a homeowner need only ask himself what action he would
take in a given interest-rate and economic environment.
81. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 13 (1984). Some observers agree with
this view. See generally LEWIS, supra note 7; MARTIN MAYER, NIGHTMARE ON WALL
STREET 155, 157 (1993) (stating "[Wall Street was) dealing with very poorly informed
people at the S&L's"). Mayer had developed his view in an earlier work by pointing to the
intentional theft of a good portion of S&L managements. See MAYER, BANK ROBBERY, su-
pra note 22, at 53. Mayer noted that the thrifts often snookered the deposit brokers, and
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The volatility of the enormous and relatively new secondary
market places great strains on existing technologies and leads to oc-
casional worries concerning the market's possible collapse. 2 This is
somewhat ironic, given that in 1984 Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capi-
tal's Richard T. Pratt, a former Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Chairman,s3 characterized technological advancement as allowing
for creation of the secondary mortgage market to begin with:
Technology is the underlying force that actually is changing the whole face
of the financial world. It affects much more than the secondary mortgage
market, of course, but it does have an extraordinary impact on this mar-
ket because two of the major technological areas have been communica-
tion and computation. Communication in the development of the mass
media and in the ability to reach any point in the U.S. at a low cost im-
mediately. This capability is combined with computer technology, which
allows you to handle a very transaction-intensive instrument.
The mortgage is a much more transaction-intensive vehicle than a U.S.
government bond. You have a transaction associated with a mortgage
every month, while with a long-term bond the figure is every six months.
Computers allow these to be handled at low cost, and it also permits a
very complicated assemblage of portfolios and investors to be coordinated.
I would think that the secondary market could not have developed without
technology, and it is the technological foundation that underlies this
whole market.84
not vice-versa. Id. at 126-27.
Another observer pointed to the complicity of Congress members who were supposed
to be monitoring S&L activity:
In 1980, 129 House members and 38 senators reported that they earned part of
their income from stock shares in commercial banks, S & L's and other financial
institutions. As a private interest of congressmen and senators, ownership of fi-
nancial institutions far exceeded their holdings in manufacturing, law firms, or
oil and gas. Even some elected representatives were engaged in finance beyond
the passive ownership of bank stocks. Forty House members and four senators
were active as directors, officers or partners of commercial banks, S & L's and
investment companies.
GREIDER, supra note 39, at 163-64.
82. See, e.g., Christopher Farrell, How Wall Street is Driving the Mortgage Market,
Bus. WK., May 4, 1987, at 108; Stephen G. Finn, Real-Estate Industry Turns to Wall
Street; Banks are Skittish, But Developers Need Capital, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at S-
31. Concerned about the stability even of government-sponsored secondary mortgage
market entities such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Congress has regulated these insti-
tutions by requiring minimum capital standards similar to those recently imposed on
savings and loans. See House Votes for Regulation of U.S. Mortgage Agencies, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1992, at D8.
83. Richard T. Pratt was single-handedly responsible for the S&L collapse. See
MAYER, BANK ROBBERY, supra note 22, at 61.
84. Merrill Lynch's Richard Pratt Discusses the Secondary Mortgage Market, TR. &
EST., Feb. 1984, at 15, 19.
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This "technological foundation" has had its problems. In 1986,
with "fail rates" in the GNMA market near 50%, the SEC and the
New York Federal Reserve Bank moved to quell widespread com-
plaints about the market and its technological inadequacies, includ-
ing its lack of automation. Trading volume in these securities had
increased so dramatically that many firms had difficulty keeping up
with the need to clear the tremendous volumes of associated paper.
In response, Morgan Stanley & Co. scaled back its mortgage-securi-
ties trading considerably."5
As often happens in cases of technological advancement, in-
creased efficiency in one link of the market chain exposes its absence
elsewhere. Thus, at a time when mortgage bankers were success-
fully speeding up their mortgage origination through computeriza-
tion, problems such as the GNMA slowdown were acting as a drag
on the system."" But by 1991, one of the primary reasons given for
the phenomenal success of CMO issues was the growing computer
capabilities of issuers and investors."
Nevertheless, the risk of real estate-based issues for technologi-
cal or other reasons remains.88 Some commentators attribute the
late 1980s S&L crisis in part to the thrifts' investment in real estate
85. SEC and New York Fed Considering Improvements for GNMA Market, SEC. WK.,
Apr. 7, 1986, at 10; see also Leah Nathans, Small Players Complain About Big Players in
Burgeoning GNMA Market, SEC. WK., May 26, 1986, at 3. Because market participants
were required, in the absence of automation, to deliver paper GNMAs, firms became
backlogged in their paperwork. Some smaller buyers complained that the larger firms
were strategically allowing themselves to become backlogged. While the buyers were
forced to pay for the trades on settlement day, the sellers took as long as three months to
deliver the securities, earning interest on the monthly principal and interest payments
while the buyers lost interest on the money they already had spent. Id.
86. See Todd Mason, How Electronic Genies Are Moving Mortgages Faster, BUS. WK,
May 9, 1988, at 138. Mortgage bankers using networked computerized loan origination
systems (CLOs) were able to grant mortgage loans in as little as two days, but complained
that paperwork required by government-sponsored agencies, such as FNMA, was slowing
down their loan closure. Id.
87. Issuance of Mortgage.Related Securities Exceeds Corporates, Munis, SEC. WL,
Aug. 26, 1991, at 10. According to one dealer, "[the computer systems of primary dealers,
the largest investment banks and the biggest commercial banks are now able to analyze
and store the vast amounts of data generated by these deals." Id. Bear, Stearns and
Credit Lyonnais actually invested in millions of dollars worth of hardware, software and
programmers' time in order to handle a single issuance of asset-backed securities sold in
Europe. Id. See also Telerate, Bear, Stearns Plan Data Services for Mortgage Market,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1991, at C14.
88. Indeed, the SEC is considering tightening control over the asset-backed and
mortgage-backed securities markets. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that
"(tihe agency might insist on greater disclosure and more warnings about the potential
risks to investors"); Kevin G. Salwen & Constance Mitchell, SEC is Weighing Steps to
Control Market in Asset-Backed Securities, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991, at C1.
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development and the real estate market's collapse, s9 specifically the
collapse of the commercial real estate market.9 While the consensus
is that other factors, i.e., risky investments generally, are to blame
for the crisis,91 a reasonable argument may be made that thrift in-
89. In 1986, more than a third of the profits of healthy thrifts came from sales of
mortgage-backed and related bonds. With rising interest rates in 1987, according to one
dealer, "the impact on thrifts' net worth could be substantial." Farrell, supra note 22, at
108. A number of commentators tie thrift losses to "real estate development activities."
See, e.g., MAYER, BANK ROBBERY, supra note 22, at 171; MICHAEL A. ROBINSON,
OVERDRAWN: THE BAILOUT OF AmERICAN SAVINGS 25-26, 184-85 (1990); ROY C. SMITH,
THE MONEY WARS 227 (1990). Robinson also notes how American Savings' back-office re-
cords were in such shambles that in many cases American Savings had no idea by whom
it was owed mortgage payments. Id. at 136.
90. As a government economist declared: "Few commentators cite the overall real
estate slump as the dominant cause of the S&L disaster. Some, however, do." Carl
Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S7, S32 (1991) (citing
Where the Lost Thrift Money Went, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1990, at A6 (quoting government
economist declaring that "thrift crisis is a real estate crisis")).
One commentator who does attribute the S&L crisis to the thrifts' investments in
mortgage-related securities is former Salomon Brothers bond trader Michael Lewis:
In any market, as in any poker game, there is a fool. The astute investor War-
ren Buffett is fond of saying that any player unaware of the fool in the market
probably is the fool in the market. In 1980, when the bond market emerged
from a long dormancy, many investors and even Wall Street banks did not have
a clue who was the fool in the new game. Salomon [Brothers] bond traders knew
about fools because it was their job. Knowing about markets is knowing about
other people's weaknesses. And a fool, they would say, was a person who was
willing to sell a bond for less or buy a bond for more than it was worth.
LEWIS, supra note 7, at 35. Referring to the S&Ls, Lewis says:
Stupid customers (the fools in the market) were a wonderful asset, but at some
level of ignorance they became a liability: They went broke....
The situation was aggravated by the ignorance of the thrifts.... They did-
n't know the mentality of the people they were up against. They didn't know the
value of what they were selling. In some cases, they didn't even know the terms
(years to maturity, rate of interest) of their own loans....
... What was happening-and is still happening-is that the guy who
sponsored the float in the town parade, the 3-6-3 Club member and golfing man,
had become America's biggest bond trader. He was also America's worst bond
trader. He was the market's fool.
Id. at 101, 104-05, 114.
Despite some criticism of Lewis' point of view, more recent findings support him. See,
e.g., RTC Chronicles Widespread Securities Speculation By Thrifts in Congressional Re-
port, RTC WATCH, Mar. 30, 1992, at 3 (finding that S&L losses in mortgage-backed secu-
rity investment, both governmentally and privately issued, were far more significant than
originally anticipated).
91. See FABOzZI & MODIGLIANI, supra note 12, at 101; Richard C. Breeden, Thumbs
on the Scale: The Role that Accounting Practices Played in the Savings and Loan Crisis,
59 FoRDHAhi L. REV. S71, S71 (1991); Felsenfeld, supra note 90, at 57; Alex M. Azar, II,
Note, FIRREA Controlling Savings and Loan Association Credit Risk Through Capital
Standards and Asset Restrictions, 100 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1990).
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solvency is partially attributable to money-losing real estate portfo-
lios and trading in the secondary mortgage market. 2
There is some relation between the performance of the huge
secondary mortgage market and the other financial markets in gen-
eral. Concern for the unsophisticated mortgage market buyer or
seller by securities market regulators is ubiquitous. 3 But when an
unsophisticated investor is defined so broadly as to include what the
average person might consider a sufficiently financially literate en-
tity, namely, the neighborhood thrift, then the need for greater pro-
tection when trading in mortgage markets seems obvious. What is
less obvious, however, is whether that enhanced investor protection
is to come from the existing securities laws or elsewhere.
One observer reflects that the S&L crisis was precipitated first by decades of long-
term fixed-rate mortgage lending carried against short-term, variable-rate liabilities.
High inflation rates lowered the market value of the long-term, fixed-rate residential
loans. Thrift managers, trying to overcome that problem by seeking risky, short-term
loans at high returns, found that the promise of these loans evaporated as inflation sub-
sided and brought down real estate values. See BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 25-26.
92. In 1978, the portion of thrift portfolios in real estate mortgages was only forty-
six percent, and by 1988 had declined to just twenty-eight percent. Felsenfeld, supra note
90, at S32. One commentator attributes this reduction to mortgage bankers taking away
some of the thrifts' traditional mortgage origination business so as to make greater prof-
its by selling the originated mortgages in the secondary market. Breeden, supra note 91,
at 573. Losing both primary and secondary mortgage market business, and approaching
insolvency because their costs for borrowing funds were exceeding the returns that they
were receiving on existing mortgages in their portfolios, the thrifts pressured Congress to
allow them to engage in ever more risky investing. The trifts thus caused their own col-
lapse. Id. at S73-74.
93. See, e.g., NASAA Urges House Panel to Modify Legislation on Mortgage-Backeds,
SEC. Wm, March 19, 1984, at 4. The North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion, a national organization composed of state securities regulators, testified before Con-
gress that the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act inadequately protected un-
sophisticated purchasers in its attempt to further the economic goal of providing more
private capital for mortgage lending. NASAA has taken the general position that inter-
ests in mortgage pools are securities. See Joseph P. Hildebrant, Regulation of Real Estate
Securities, in BLUE SKY LAWS 243 (1990). The SEC also takes this position despite court
decisions to the contrary. See, e.g., Exclusion From the Definition of Investment Company
For Certain Structure Financings, 17 C.F.R. pt. 270 (1992). For further discussion about
concern for unsophisticated buyers and sellers, see Self-Regulatory Organizations, 57
Fed. Reg. 49,732 (SEC 1992) (discussing how NASD, a self-regulatory organization for
over-the-counter (OTC) sales of securities, proposed tighter control over sales of CMOs
because they are "extremely complex and require full and fair disclosure to assist the in-
vestor in understanding them"); Block, supra note 72, at B16 (quoting SEC Commissioner
Richard Roberts who, concerned that asset-backed deals may be too complicated for small
investors, stated: 'What's good for sophisticated investors isn't necessarily good for Ma
and Pa Kettle. . . . "); Parker, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing how SEC, worried that inves-
tors did not understand the risks associated with complex asset-backed securities, consid-
ered requiring greater disclosure and more warnings about potential risks).
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C. Different Types of Mortgage Instruments
1. Primary Mortgage Market Instruments. The types of mort-
gages available in the primary market can be easily summarized,
and help place those sold in the secondary market in contextual per-
spective." The mortgage on an individual family residence with
which we are all most familiar is the fixed-rate percentage mortgage
(FRPM). While typically for a term of thirty years, the FRPM is now
being offered for loan terms anywhere between five and forty years.
The interest rate for a fixed-rate mortgage remains constant during
the term of the loan, and the loan is amortized; that is, the borrower
makes equal monthly payments of interest and principal. 5
An adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) has its interest rate ad-
justed periodically, usually at intervals of one year, although some-
times at six months up to five years." The rate is determined by
adding a specific number of percentage points, known as "margin,"
to a particular index.97 (Various indices employed as benchmarks
include the six-month treasury bill rate, the various treasury secu-
rities rates, national average mortgage rates, prime rates and even
the consumer price index). Monthly payments are adjusted when the
interest is adjusted "so as to amortize the then-unpaid principal over
the balance of the term of the loan."98 The interest which may be
charged on an ARM is usually capped at a maximum rate.99
One new type of primary mortgage market product is the bi-
weekly mortgage, in which payments are made twice, rather than
once, a month. This accelerated payment schedule allows principal
to be paid off more quickly, thereby reducing long-term interest
payments. 10 While most mortgage lenders allow borrowers to pay
back their loans ahead of schedule, a prepayment penalty may be
charged.
94. Additionally, a summary of primary mortgages is useful because many of the
judicial opinions analyzed in this Comment concern hybrid transactions, or those in
which the nature of the primary instrument helps determine the status of the secondary
or tertiary instrument. See infra part III.
95. Stanley L. Warsoff, What Clients Can Learn About Real Estate Loans, NA'L
L.J., May 29, 1989, at 20.
96. In October 1981, the FHLBB and the Comptroller of the Currency finalized
regulations allowing national banks and federally chartered thrifts (S&Ls) to originate or
purchase adjustable rate mortgages, in order to reduce lender risk and enhance lender
flexibility. 12 C.F.R. pt. 29 (1981); 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a (1982). The use of ARMs, however,
detracts from one of the goals of mortgage securitization, namely, uniformity of the in-
strument. See Lance, supra note 43, at 438-39.
97. Lance, supra note 43, at 438-39.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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2. Secondary Mortgage Market Instruments. The types of mort-
gage instruments available in the secondary market are manifold,
defying strict categorization, and increasing in number with the in-
creasing inventiveness of issuers. Typically,1 1 in the case of mort-
gage-backed securities, a pool of mortgages 10 2 either originated by
the issuer, or purchased from other lenders, is formed. 03 The loans
in the pool are then transferred to a trustee, who will issue certifi-
cates evidencing ownership in the pool. 04 The certificates are sold by
the pooling entity to investors. 5 The originator frequently services
the pool, collecting mortgage payments on behalf of the investors in
the trust, and receiving a fee deducted from the interest payments
collected from the borrowers. 0 6
The most common types of mortgage-related instruments are
summarized as follows:
- Whole Loans. A whole loan is simply defined as the total out-
standing principal balance on a mortgage. 0 7 By selling whole loans,
the lender may immediately recover the entire principal balance of a
loan and use the recovered funds for relending. The lender avoids
interest rate and default and refinancing risks inherent in mortgage
loans, while sometimes retaining servicing responsibility, garnering
servicing fees.' On the downside, markets for whole loans are es-
sentially limited to buyers such as other thrifts that are familiar
101. Not all secondary mortgage market transactions consist of the sale of numerous
pooled primary instruments. Often, developers and others sell mortgages (or participation
interests in mortgages) to raise funds for development. See infra part III for a discussion
of cases including these types of small, secondary market transactions.
102.
A pool [of mortgages] is just a legal and tax structure. There is not much in the
deal that is really separate from the legal structure, except the quality of the
underlying mortgages, which are usually subject to well-established controls.
It's a question of developing the most secure and efficient legal structure for the
offering.
Masters, supra note 6, at 1-2. Nevertheless, says attorney John A. Quisenberry, "[tihese
deals are extremely complex, and there are lots of different ways to do them and innova-
tions yet to be invented." Id.
103. Pittman, supra note 51, at 502 ("In order to hedge against changes in interest
rates while the pools are being formed, the originator may enter into forward commit-
ments, in which investors contract to purchase, at a fixed price, interests in the pool of
mortgage loans that the originator expects to produce in the future.").
104. Id.
105. Bradner, supra note 18, at 981.
106. Id. Factors affecting prepayment rates of the pool as an aggregate include the
age, size and location of the pool. See SEAN BECKETTI & CHARLES MORRIS, THE PRE-
PAYMENT EXPERIENCE OF FNMA MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 34-41 (1990).
107. Gary J. Silversmith, Mortgage-Backed Securities in the Nineties, 7 TAX MGMT.
REAL EST. J., Jan. 2, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter Silversmith, Securities in the Nineties].
108. Id.
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with mortgage loans.10 9
Whole loan purchases account for a large portion of secondary
market sales.110 Thrift managers like to hold whole loan purchases of
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) as a hedge on interest rates."'
Drawbacks to the lender include: the preclusion of leverage of
funds (as is available, for example, in participation sales);12 the re-
quirement of extensive transaction documentation; and the transfer
of all original loan documents to the buyer.13
• Loan Participations. In a loan participation, the holder of the
primary mortgage sells a portion of it, that is, transfers an equitable
interest in it." Two or more parties share the cash flow in propor-
tion to their ownership interest in the mortgage. Investors generally
receive a guaranteed yield, so that prepayments of the underlying
mortgage pools do not affect the investor's yield."' Advantages to the
seller of a loan participation include: simplified documentation re-
quirements; no immediate cash shortfall (because participation in-
terests are sold at par); and the ability to leverage mortgage funds.
e Pass-Through Certificates. Pass-Through Certificates vest the
holder with an undivided ownership interest in the portfolio of
mortgage loan pools and the right to receive pro rata shares of cash
flows. All principal payments, interest payments, and prepaid prin-
cipal are "passed through" to the certificate holder."6 Private issuers
like this type of MBS because of its simplicity.117 (One commentator
says that mortgage pass-throughs are so attractive to investors that
they will accept a lower yield on them than on the underlying mort-
gages, because the pass-throughs are less risky, as they are guaran-
teed against default, are more liquid, and bring greater certainty to
prepayment patterns)."'
* Mortgage-Backed Bonds and Pay-Through Bonds. The holder
of these types of bonds does not own any part of the underlying pool
of mortgages but instead holds a debt instrument (similar to a cor-
109. Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 30, 13.
110. In 1987, whole loan purchases totaled $134 billion, compared with MBS pur-
chases of $225 billion. BARTLETT, supra note 10, at 90.
111. Id. at 59, 90-91.
112. Leverage of mortgage funds is accomplished by selling a participation interest,
receiving funds for the sale and using the funds to sell more participation interests. Id.
113. Id.
114. Bradner, supra note 18, at 974.
115. Silversmith, Securities in the Nineties, supra note 107, at 3.
116. See Bradner, supra note 18, at 982; Grobmeyer & Garrett, supra note 46, at
223.
117. Mortgage-Backed Securities, supra note 30, 101.
118. However, mortgage pass-throughs are still more risky than traditional fixed in-
come securities. See BECKETTI & MORRIS, supra note 106, at 7-8.
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porate bond) whose payment is secured by the mortgage pool." 9 The
market value of the underlying mortgage pool as a whole secures
mortgage-backed bonds, while pay-throughs are secured by the in-
come stream from the monthly interest, principal payments and any
prepayments by the mortgagors (borrowers). 2 ' Unlike pass-through
certificate holders (where principal and interest are passed to
investors on a pro rata basis), mortgage-backed bond investors re-
ceive cash flows redirected on a priority basis to various classes of
bondholders.' 2 '
Mortgage Pay-Through Bonds are a hybrid of pass-through se-
curities and mortgage-backed bonds. As with mortgage-backed
bonds, the investor owns the bond while the issuer retains owner-
ship of the collateral; unlike mortgage-backed bonds, however, pay-
through bonds link the cash flow from the collateral to the cash flow
on the bonds.122
0 Collateralized Mortgage Obligations. " According to one
trader in such bonds, the creation of the CMO was the beginning of
the end for the huge profits being made in mortgage securities in the
early 1980s.' 2 To create CMOs, one gathered hundreds of millions of
dollars worth of ordinary mortgage bonds (Fannie Maes, Ginnie
Maes, and Freddie Macs) and placed them in a trust, which paid a
predictable rate of interest to its owners, through "tranches," or
classes of payments.' 5 The owners of the first tranche received all of
the prepayments first, while the lucky third tranche owner received
prepayment (and thus, yield reducing) funds last. It became possible
to predict with a fair degree of accuracy a time of maturity for each
tranche, such as five years for the first tranche, ten years for the
119. Bradner, supra note 18, at 93 ("The issuance of bonds rather than ownership
interests in the pool allows the originator to amortize the loss on the discounted 'sale' in-
stead of showing it all in one year."). Mortgage-backed bonds are similar to traditional
corporate bonds. The only significant distinction is that mortgage-backed bonds use mort-
gage-related collateral. Federal Credit Union Investment in Mortgage Securities, 52 Fed.
Reg. 27,994 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. ch. VII) [hereinafter Federal Credit Union
Investment].
120. Federal Credit Union Investment, supra note 119.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. For detailed explanations of these types of mortgage instruments, see Thomas
A. Kasper & Les Parker, Understanding Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, 1987
COLUmi. Bus. L. REv. 139; Brant K Mailer, The Collateralized Mortgage Obligation: The
Latest Phase in the Evolution of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 299
(1985); Susan M. Golden, Comment, Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Probing the
Limits of National Bank Powers Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025
(1987).
124. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 136.
125. Id.
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second tranche, and fifteen years for the third and last tranche. 126
This increased predictability made CMOs very popular. For ex-
ample, in June 1983, the year the first CMO was issued by Freddie
Mac, American pension funds controlled $600 billion in assets, and
none of that was invested in home mortgages. By the middle of 1986,
pension funds held about $30 billion in CMOs. 127 International in-
vestors bought CMOs as well, looking for higher-yielding invest-
ments. The predictability of CMOs led to an increased number of
buyers,' which drove down the returns paid to the investor.
121
e Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs). The
Tax Reform Act of 198610 allowed issuers to avoid dual taxation
through Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (which operate
so similarly to CMOs that the terms are almost interchangeable).131
REMICs have two broad classes of investors, regular interest hold-
ers and residual interest holders, with these classes being subdi-
vided further in much the same manner as CMO tranches.'32 Effec-
tive in 1992, REMICs became the preferred entity for issuances of
multiple class (tranche) MBSs, as they allow income from a pool of
mortgages placed in a trust or other entity to pass through to inves-
tors without tax consequences at the mortgage pool level.
3
* Stripped Securities. A Stripped Security divides the cash flow
from a pool of mortgages or from mortgage securities into Interest
Only (10) and Principal Only (PO) participation certificates. An 10
investor receives all of the interest cash flows and none of the prin-
cipal, whereas a PO investor receives all of the principal cash flows
and none of the interest.3' IOs and POs have volatile price charac-
teristics based on prepayment variability on the underlying mort-
gages and thus on the maturity of the stripped securities. IOs gen-
126. Id.
127. Id. at 137.
128. Wall Street investment banks sold $60 billion of CMOs between 1983 and 1988,
channeling money into home mortgage finance. Id. at 138.
129. CMOs eventually were created with five, and even ten, tranches. The invest-
ment firms continually created new products that were outside the reach of regulators
and not required to be listed on thrift balance sheets. This gave the S&Ls new ways to
expand (or contract). Id.
130. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
131. Pittman, supra note 51, at 508.
132. Id. at 509. For tax implications of REMICs, see John W. Alexander & David
Culp, Taxable Mortgage Pool Rules Now in Effect, 23 TAX ADVISER, June 1992, at 359;
Thomas C. Pearson & Dennis R. Schmidt, Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 19
TAX ADVISER, June 1988, at 397; Ellin Rosenthal, Mortgage-Backed Securities Industry
Identifies Wrinkles in Technical Corrections Act REMIC Rules, 39 TAX NOTES, Apr. 25,
1988, at 427; Lee A. Sheppard, Lyden Delivers Valentine for REMIC Issuers, 54 TAX
NOTES, Feb. 24, 1992, at 935.
133. Pearson & Schmidt, supra note 132, at 397.
134. Notice, 56 Fed. Reg. 263,269 (1991).
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erally increase in value as interest rates rise, and POs decrease in
value. When interest rates decline, the reverse happens.
13 5
* Planned Amortization Bonds (PACs) and Floating Rate
Tranches. 'Floaters" generally hinge the rate of return received by
investors to interest rate changes reflected in benchmark market
indices, usually the London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR).136
e Real Estate Securities. Real Estate Securities may refer to
transactions in either the primary or secondary market. They inc-
lude common stock secured by commercial real estate and real es-
tate municipal bonds, both investment grade and "high-yield,"
backed by physical property or mortgages. Real estate "high yield"
bonds are analogous to corporate issues, carrying low or no rating
and high risk, backed by second or higher order mortgages.
137
* Municipal Bonds. Municipal bonds, along with real estate
property taxes, compose the primary revenue source for municipal
governments. They include Direct Loan Program Housing Bonds
(DLHBs), which finance new construction, and Mortgage Purchase
Bonds (MPBs), used to buy existing mortgage pools. The issuing
agency sells housing revenue bonds, and purchases mortgages di-
rectly from thrifts (S&Ls), the bonds secured by mortgage pay-
ments. 18
II. WHAT ISA "SECURITY"?
A. Statutory and Regulatory Beginnings
Thus far this Comment has referred for convenience and, in ac-
cordance with common practice, to various secondary mortgage
market financial instruments as mortgage-backed, or mortgage-re-
lated, "securities." It is important to note, however, that the securi-
ties statutes and regulations promulgated thereunder contain spe-
cific definitions which the courts have struggled to parse even fur-
135. Id. Perhaps these phenomena may best be illustrated by a recent example. IOs
decrease in value as interest rates decline, because more people prepay their mortgages
in order to restructure their real estate debt and take advantage of the lower interest
rates. Prepayment allows principal to be repaid but cuts into the amount of interest that
would have been paid on the loan had the loan gone to full term. Some midwestern mu-
nicipalities that heavily invested in IOs have recently lost significant dollar amounts. See
Government Sponsored Enterprises Respond To Derivatives Crash, INT'L BANK ACCT.,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 3.
136. Pittman, supra note 51, at 510-11. LIBOR is used in part because the index is
popular with foreign investors and also because LIBOR-based borrower rates often are
lower than rates based on other indices. BARTLET, supra note 10, at 102-03; see also
James T. Parks, The ABCs of CMOs, REMICs and IOIPOs: Rocket Science Comes to
Mortgage Finance, 171 J. OF ACCT., Apr. 1991, at 41, 44.
137. CHYNLOY, supra note 20, at 243.
138. Id. at 243-44, 246-47.
1994] 785
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ther so that instruments commonly assumed to be "securities" are
often found not to fit that technical definition.
As discussed earlier, the federal securities laws were enacted
during the Great Depression of the 1930s in response to significant
losses incurred by securities investors. 1 9 The Securities Act of 1933
was designed to require disclosure to investors of material facts con-
cerning securities publicly offered for sale, and to prevent fraud or
deceit in the sale of securities generally.140 The security issuer is re-
quired to file a registration statement and prospectus containing fi-
nancial information to the SEC, and sales cannot be made until the
registration statement is made "effective."' The SEC does not
comment on the merits of the security, leaving that judgment to the
investor after full and fair disclosure has been made.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the registration
and regulation of securities exchanges, the registration of securities
listed on these exchanges, the registration of certain securities
traded "over-the counter" (OTC), registration of national securities
associations, brokers and dealers, the prevention of fraud and deceit,
and authorizes the Federal Reserve System to regulate the use of
credit in securities transactions. 4 3
Companies wishing to have their securities listed and regis-
tered for public trading on an exchange must file a registration ap-
plication with the SEC, so that interested persons can gain access to
the information if desired.'" The Exchange Act has provisions re-
garding proxy solicitations, insider trading, credit, market surveil-
lance, tender offers and corporate takeovers. The Act also allows for
self-policing among OTC brokers and dealers such as the National
Association of Securities Dealers.' 45
139. Kansas enacted the first comprehensive state securities law in 1911.
BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 79, § 1.23. State securities laws are colorfully referred
to as "blue sky laws," after a Supreme Court decision characterized speculative invest-
ment schemes as having "no more basis than so many feet of blue sky." Hall v. Geiger-
Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). This Comment is concerned only with federal legis-
lation.
140. BLOOMENTHAL & WING, supra note 79, § 1.0211].
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at § 1.0311].
144. Id.
145. Id. at §§ 1.0312]-1.03[9]. A discussion of the many remaining federal securities
statutes is beyond the scope of this Comment, which is concerned only with definitions
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. "The Securities
Act and the Exchange Act constitute virtually the entire body of general federal securities
regulation. Most securities lawyers deal primarily with these two acts. There are, how-
ever, a number of other federal securities statutes, each of which deals with a specialized
area." LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 3 (2d ed. 1990).
The other statutues include the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, which requires that
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Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,146 and § 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,17 contain definitions of a "security"
so similar that the courts treat the two sections as virtually identi-
cal. 148 Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act provides that:
(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral loyalty or lease, any collat-
eral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transfer-
able share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any se-
curity, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating
to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a
"security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note,
draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace,
or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited. 49
The Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to its rule-
making authority, has promulgated a rule against fraud in the pur-
chase or sale of a security which has been the subject of much liti-
gation:
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
bonds, notes, debentures and similar securities publicly offered for sale be offered under
an indenture that meets SEC requirements; the Investment Company Act of 1940, which
requires the registration and regulation of companies that are engaged primarily in the
investing, owning, holding and trading of securities; the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,
which regulates investment advisors under similar rules pursuant to the Exchange Act
for broker-dealers; and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, which required
that public utilities register and file periodic reports with the SEC, and the corporate
simplification of utility holding companies. Id. at 3-4.
146. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988). See also 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation -
Federal 16 (1993)
148. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 56 n.1 (1990).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988); see also 69 AM. JuR. 2D Securities Regulation -
Federal § 16 (1993).
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(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(3) to engage in any act,, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security. 50
As one commentator has noted, Rule 10(b)-5 "probably provides
the most attractive remedy" for investors who allege fraud.15' If a
10(b)-5 cause of action does not lie, then the investor's alternative is
a common law fraud claim. For a 10(b)-5 action, whether or not the
instrument is a "security," if disputed, is the threshold question.
B. Judicial Construction Prior to Reves
1. The Supreme Court. Before Reves, a plaintiff contending that
the mortgage notes either sold fraudulently to or purchased fraudu-
lently from him met the federal securities law definition of "security"
had to persuade a court under judicially-created tests not designed
specifically for "notes." Supreme Court and lower federal court deci-
sions construing the word "security" have been categorized in a
number of ways. However, it is generally accepted that there are
three distinct tests for Securities Acts instruments which have been
denominated (1) "investment contracts," (2) "stock," and now, after-
Reves, (3) "notes."
9 "Investment Contracts." The Supreme Court has had occasion
to construe the meaning of "security" as used in the federal securi-
ties statutes a number of times. In the first such case, SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corporation, 15 2 the Court considered whether the sale
of assignments of interests in oil and gas leases constituted securi-
ties. Specifically, the Court held that they met the definition of the
less specific "investment contracts."53 The Court reasoned that the
buyers of the assignments stood to profit by the increased value of
their interests if oil were to be discovered on adjacent property.
In its subsequent holdings, the Supreme Court expanded on the
investment contract approach in SEC v. W.J. Howey Company.'54
150. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1994).
151. Randall W. Quinn, After Reves v. Ernst & Young, When are Certificates of De-
posit 'Notes" Subject to Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act?, 46 BUS. LAW. 173, 173
(1990).
152. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
153. Id. at 348.
154. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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Holding that the sale of units in a citrus grove and related service
contracts for cultivating, harvesting and marketing the crops were
securities, the Court stressed that the term "investment contract"
represented a "flexible rather than a static principle,"'1 55 meant to be
broadly construed. Form was to be "disregarded for substance and
emphasis.., placed on economic reality."156
In Howey, the Court devised a test to determine the existence of
an "investment contract." The Howey test consisted of three, four, or
even five prongs, depending on one's interpretation. 57 Howey con-
siders an investment contract a transaction which entails: (1) an in-
vestment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with an expecta-
tion of profits (4) solely from the efforts of others. 58
Although meant to apply only to non-specific "investment con-
tracts," the Howey factors became, at times and with variations, the
federal courts' test of choice for a variety of other instruments, in-
cluding those specifically enumerated in the statute, such as stocks
or notes. 5 9 But the Court's decision offered ineffective guidance. 160
Thus, one federal district court judge lamented: "[I]n the end one is
left with the impression that he is dealing with an area of the law
subject to wide variations, serious anomalies, and judicial disagree-
ment, if not confusion. In short, the wealth of judicial writings on
the subject has produced few discernible principles of decision." 16' As
Carl Schneider recently observed: "The constant heavy flow of liti-
gation shows that much uncertainty remains in defining the term
security.... [Tihere are many individual opinions that depart from
[discernible] patterns, and, as in many areas of securities law,
authority can be found for conflicting propositions. In general, the
decisions are fact intensive."62
a "Stock." In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,63 the
155. Id. at 299.
156. Id. at 298.
157. See, e.g., Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 981, 989 (D. Neb. 1977)
(holding that Howey test consists of just three prongs); James D. Gordon, III, Interplane-
tary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383, 394 (1990)
(explaining that Howey test, as modified by later decisions, contains five prongs).
158. Gordon, supra note 157, at 385.
159. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL.. SECURITIES REGUIATION 265 (7th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter JENNINGS, SECURITIES REGULATION].
160. The Court admitted as much in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S.
681, 688 (1985): "It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear on the proper
method of analysis for determining when an instrument is a 'security." Id.
161. Van Huss v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 356 (N.D. Tex.
1976).
162. Carl W. Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a 'Security: 1990 Update, 24 REV.
SEC. COMMODITIES REG. 13, 17 (1991).
163. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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Supreme Court held that purchases of shares of stock in a nonprofit
housing cooperative were not securities. The Court relied on the
"economic reality" language in the Howey case, and rejected a
literalist approach. The Court stated that although the shares sold
were labeled "stock," they did not meet the statutory definition of a
"security" as "stock"'1' because they lacked the attributes of ordinary
stock.165 However, in Landreth Timber Company v. Landreth,16 the
Court moved closer to a literalist approach in recognizing that the
Howey test was to be applied not to all instruments, but just to
"unusual" ones:
Respondents... argue that our cases require us in every instance to look
to the economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the
Howey test has been met....
... [I]t is important to understand the contexts within which these
cases were decided. All of the cases upon which respondents rely involved
unusual instruments not easily characterized as "securities."... Thus, if
the Acts were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been be-
cause the economic reality underlying the transactions indicated that the
instruments were actually of a type that falls within the usual concept of a
security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument involved is tradi-
tional stock, plainly within the statutory definition. There is no need here,
as there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the
instrument to determine whether the Acts apply.1
67
The Supreme Court added another twist to the various tests for
what constitutes a "security" in the widely criticized decision, Ma-
rine Bank v. Weaver.'1 The Court held that a certificate of deposit
issued by a federally regulated bank was not a security, primarily
because securities law protection was not needed in the presence of
another risk-reducing scheme that centered around the federal
banking laws.'69 The Court found authority for its position in prefa-
tory language to the Exchange Act's § 3(a)(10), i.e., that unless "the
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
165. The Supreme Court in Forman re-formulated the familiar Howey test: "The
touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reason-
able expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
166. 471 U.S. 681, 697 (1985) (concerning the sale of all the stock of a company, and
holding that sale did indeed encompass sale of "securities" within definition of federal
statutes).
167. Id. at 689-90.
168. 455 U.S. 551 (1982). See STEINBERG, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, supra note 79, at
12-45 (discussing extensively Weaver's errors, especially its misplaced reliance on the
"context clause").
169. 455 U.S. at 558.
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context otherwise requires,"17 an instrument will be deemed a se-
curity. In Marine Bank, the Court held that the context did indeed
"otherwise require."
. "Notes." In 1990, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Reves v. Ernst & Young.' The Court held that yet another test
was required when considering a class of instruments falling under
the category of "notes." Thus, to date, the Court has presented se-
curities practitioners with three distinct tests, one for investment
contracts, one for stock and one for notes. Each test has various
permutations, including the economic realities underlying the
transaction, the context clause and the existence of an alternative
regulatory scheme.
2. Circuit Courts. The lower federal courts also have added
permutations to all these tests. Although these permutations are
legion, they will not be discussed here. This Comment focuses on
notes alone or, more specifically, the application of the Reves analy-
sis to mortgage notes. Since the Supreme Court previously had
stated that each decision might be fact specific, 72 perhaps it is no
surprise that the Reves Court borrowed a little from Forman,7 s
Joiner,74 Howey,'7 Marine Bank,76 and the Second Circuit's "family
resemblance" test.7 7 Like the rest of securities law, the Reves "note"
decision appears to be a patchwork.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1O) (1988).
171. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
172. "In general, the decisions are fact intensive." Schneider, supra note 162, at 17;
see Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 561 n.11 (1982):
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between
transacting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a "security" as de-
fined by the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated
on the basis of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes in-
tended to be served, and the factual setting as a whole.
Id.
The Reves Court moved away from this notion, stating- "A commitment to an exami-
nation of the economic realities of a transaction does not necessarily entail a case-by-case
analysis of every instrument .... "Reves, 494 U.S. at 62 (emphasis added).
173. 494 U.S. at 66 (comparing Forman's "inducement to purchase" with Reves'
"motivation" of buyer and seller).
174. Id. (adopting Joiner's examination of the "plan of distribution" of the instru-
ment, and whether it is an instrument in "common trading for speculation or invest-
ment").
175. Id. at 68 (comparing Howey's "plan of distribution" to the Reves' co-op).
176. Id. at 67 (adopting Marine Bank's "existence of another regulatory scheme" as
the fourth prong in the new Reves' "family resemblance" test for notes).
177. Id. at 65 (adopting in its entirety and expanding the Second Circuit's distinctive
"family resemblance" test for the presence of a "note," first enunciated in Exchange Nat'l
Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1976)).
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Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act 78 provides that:
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture .... 1' "Note" is not defined in the Exchange Act, but gen-
erally is understood to be "an instrument containing an express and
absolute promise of a signer to pay to a specified person or order, or
bearer, a definite sum of money at a specified time."180 A "mortgage
note" is a note "evidencing a loan for which real estate has been of-
fered as security."' 81
Three tests emerged for separating those notes deemed to be "securities"
for securities acts purposes and notes that were nonsecurities. The most
widely adopted test was the "commercial/investmen" test which was
adopted by the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.
The "risk capital" test was espoused by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits and
in Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., the Second
Circuit adopted the "strong family resemblance" test.182
e The Commercial/Investment Test. Through this test, the eco-
nomic realities of an underlying transaction are analyzed in order to
determine whether the transaction represents an investment or a
commercial transaction. Essentially, the test examines "whether the
note is collateralized, how the proceeds are used, whether repay-
ment is dependent on the borrower's income, whether the note is
speculative, whether the borrower or the lender initiated the loan,
and whether the note is one of many notes issued to many lend-
ers."'8
The circuit courts employing this test developed their own cri-
teria for determining what type of transaction was involved. In Mc-
Clure v. First National Bank of Lubbock,' 4 the Fifth Circuit decided
that investment transaction notes shared at least three qualities: (1)
they were offered to "some class of investors," (2) they were
"acquired... for speculation or investment," and (3) their proceeds
178. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988) (emphasis added).
180. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990); see also 11 A. JUR. 2D Bills and
Notes §§ 1, 21 (1963).
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990).
182. JENNINGS, supra note 159, at 300. See Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 879 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989), affd, 900 F.2d 1485 (1990); Futura Dev. Corp. v.
Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1985), cert denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Hunssinger v.
Rockford Business Credits, Inc., 745 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1984); Union Planters Nat'l Bank
v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454
U.S. 1124 (1981); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir.
1976); Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
McClure v. First Natl Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 930
(1975).
183. Gordon, supra note 157, at 388.
184. 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975).
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were used to "obtain investment assets, directly or indirectly."1 5 In
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc.,l18 the Seventh
Circuit cited six criteria for determining whether notes were com-
mercial in nature or investments: (1) the community's characteriza-
tion of the instrument; (2) the use of the proceeds; (3) the reliance on
the efforts of others; (4) the number of notes issued, the number of
payees and dollar amount of the transaction; (5) the note's term
length, and (6) the characterization of the instruments in financial
statements.
187
* "Risk Capital." "Risk capital" analysis is a hybrid of both the
investment/commercial test, and the Howey and Forman tests. It dif-
ferentiates between note transactions involving "risk capital," which
are likely to be investment securities, and those evidencing "risky
loans," which are commercial. It further requires that "risk capital"
be subject to the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.'
"['Risk capital'] requires the weighing of a number of factors, such as
the maturity length of the note, the collateralization of the note, the
form of the obligation, the issuance of the note to either a single
party or a large class of investors, the relationship between the
amount involved and the size of the [borrower]'s business, and the
contemplated use of the proceeds."'89
III. REVES V. ERNST & YOuNG19°: THE "FAMILY RESEMBLANCE" TEST
A. The Supreme Court's 1990 Decision'9'
In Reves, the Court unanimously adopted a modified version of
the Second Circuit's "family resemblance" test for notes, but split 5-4
over whether the 1934 Securities Exchange Act's exclusion of notes
with a maturity of less than nine months at the time of issuance
applied to demand notes.'2
185. Id. at 493-94.
186. 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975).
187. Id. at 1361.
188. See, e.g., Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir.
1976) (per curiam).
189. Gordon, supra note 157, at 389.
190. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
191. The Supreme Court recently held in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163
(1993), that for RICO liability to apply, participation in the conduct of a RICO enterprise's
affairs required a professional to manage or operate the enterprise. Id. See Marcia Coyle,
RICO Limits Set For Professionals, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 3; Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie
L. Johnson, Freeing Corporate Professional Advisers From the Threat of RICO Liability,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 1; Court Limits Relevance of Law to Accountants, HARTFORD
COURANT, Mar. 4, 1993, at A3.
192. Reves, 494 U.S. at 76 (holding that demand notes, which can mature in more or
less than nine months, did not fall within the Acts exception). The Second Circuit first
1994] 793
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Originally farmers' cooperatives were formed as a turn-of-the-
century Populist initiative meant to avoid deflationary produce
prices and usurious interest rates for borrowing. The cooperatives
would buy farm produce, store it in cooperative warehouses, sell the
produce at optimum prices and thereby protect farmers from low
prices. The cooperatives also bought supplies wholesale and sold
them to farmers at reduced interest rates. The largest such co-op,
the statewide Texas Exchange, was also the first to fail. In order to
raise capital, the co-op sold stock shares to farmers and tried to raise
additional funds by selling notes that pledged members' farms as
collateral. The co-op ordered supplies only to discover that the banks
would not lend it money. The co-op failed in 1889 after only one
year.1
93
In Reves, the Farmer's Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma,
Inc. raised much of its capital through the sale of uncollateralized,
uninsured notes payable on the noteholder's demand ("demand
notes") that paid higher interest rates than those offered by local fi-
nancial institutions. The co-op offered notes to both members and
nonmembers, advertising their purchase "Investment Program."
Over 1,600 people bought notes that were worth, in aggregate, ap-
proximately $10 million.'9
The co-op had hired the accounting firm of Arthur Young & Co.,
defendant Ernst & Young's predecessor in interest, to audit its fi-
nancial statements. After the co-op filed for bankruptcy, the plaintiff
noteholders brought suit, alleging that Arthur Young had inten-
tionally failed to follow generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) in its valuation of one of the co-op's major assets, a gasohol
plant. The plaintiffs claimed that Arthur Young had violated pro-
hibitions on fraud under both state and federal securities laws. They
maintained that if Arthur Young had audited the co-op properly, its
insolvency would have been apparent and the plaintiffs would not
have invested in it. Arthur Young, in turn, argued that the demand
notes in question were not "securities."9 5
The plaintiffs prevailed in the district court, and won a $6.1
million judgment. The Eighth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the federal securities law
claims. The Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision, holding
announced the "family resemblance" test in Exchange Nat1 Bank v. Touche Ross & Co.,
544 F.2d 1126 (1976). See also Promissory Notes Sold By Farmers' Co.Op are Securities,
Divided High Court Says, 54 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 343 (Feb. 26, 1990); Supreme
Court Announces Test For Determining When Notes Are Securities, 58 U.S.L.W. 1129
(U.S. Feb. 27, 1990).
193. GREDER, supra note 39, at 251-53.
194. Reves, 494 U.S. at 58-59.
195. Id.
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that the demand notes in question were indeed "securities" and that
an action could lie under federal securities laws.19
In so doing, the Supreme Court rejected the Howey investment
contract test, holding that it was not applicable to instruments that
were deemed "notes," but only to investment contracts. The Court
also rejected its Landreth Timber 97 analysis of "stock" as one of the
enumerated categories under the definition of "security" in the se-
curities laws,' holding that "note," although similarly enumerated,
is a "relatively broad term that encompasses instruments with
widely varying characteristics," both investment and commercial.'99
The Court rejected the "risk capital" approach. While the Court
also rejected the investment/commercial test, it found that test suf-
ficiently similar to the "family resemblance test" to require incorpo-
ration into the latter's analytical framework.20 The Court stated
that a "note"/"security" analysis must start with the rebuttable pre-
sumption that every note is a security, with the possible exception of
short-term commercial paper.201 It then adopted the Second Circuit's
list of exceptions for notes that fall outside the definition of
"security." These include
the note delivered in consumer financing, the note secured by a mortgage/
on a home, the short-term note secured by a lien on a small business or
some of its assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank cus-
tomer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of accounts receivable,
or a note which simply formalizes an open-account debt incurred in the
ordinary course of business (particularly if, as in the case of the customer
of a broker, it is collateralized)... [and] notes evidencing loans by com-
mercial banks for current operations.
20 2
Notes which do not bear a "strong family resemblance" to those on
the enumerated list are presumed to be "securities" and thus subject
to the federal securities statutory and regulatory prohibitions
196. Id.
197. 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
198. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
199. 494 U.S. at 62.
200. Id. at 64-65. Indeed, the Court on more than one occasion stressed its approval
of the distinction between commercial transactions and investments. See, e.g., id. at 61
("Congress' purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in what-
ever form they are made and by whatever name they are called" (emphasis in original));
id. at 68 ("the transaction is most naturally conceived as an investment in a business en-
terprise rather than as a purely commercial or consumer transaction"). Cf Futura Dev.
Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that the conceptual basis of
the commercial/investment, risk capital and family resemblance tests, "and the consid-
erations examined by the courts in applying the tests[,] tend to be very similar although
the focus is slightly different").
201. 494 U.S. at 65.
202. Id.
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against fraud in the purchase or sale of securities. 23
The Supreme Court expanded on the Second Circuit's "family
resemblance" list by identifying four factors to assess in determining
whether a transaction bears that resemblance. These factors are:
(1) the motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to en-
ter into the transaction;
(2) the plan of distribution of the instrument, to determine whether it is
an instrument in which there is common trading for speculation or in-
vestment;
(3) the reasonable expectations of the investing public; and
(4) the existence of another regulatory scheme that significantly reduces
the risk of the instrument.2°
Although the Court intends this modified family resemblance test to
apply only to "notes," a comparison of the four factors in the Reves
test to the Howey, Marine Bank, investment/commercial and "risk
capital" tests reveals similarities. Legal commentators in the wake
of Reves have made such comparisons.
B. The Legal Community's Reaction to Reves
1. Approval of the Reves "Family Resemblance" Test. Despite
the Court's rejection of the majority approach and its adoption of a
patchwork version of the Second Circuit's minority "family resem-
blance" test, legal commentators have overwhelmingly approved the
Reves decision. It remains to be seen whether this approval will
continue in light of the inconsistent application of Reves.
Most commentators who praise the Reves decision approve of
its resolution of the inherent ambiguities in the circuit courts' differ-
ent tests for determining whether notes are "securities." These
commentators suggest that the uniformity imposed by Reves will
make practitioners' jobs easier by increasing outcome predictabil-
ity. 2 5 Other commentators approve of Reves on its merits, arguing
203. These prohibitions include the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5: Employment
of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
204. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
205. See B. Joseph Krabacher, Promissory Notes as Securities, 19 COLO. LAW. 1585,
1587-88 (1990):
The Supreme Court has eliminated the split among the courts of appeal as to
the conceptual framework for analyzing notes as securities .... Reves answered
some questions that have long needed to be addressed. There are uncertainties,
however, left by the Reves decision that will have to be resolved by the courts in
the future.
Id.; Scott D. Museles, To Be or Note to Be a Security: Reves v. Ernst & Young, 40 CATH.
U. L. REv. 711, 743, 751 (1991):
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that the decision strikes the proper balance between various ex-
tremes.2 6 Two commentators suggest that Reves accords with the
spirit of the securities acts,07 while another approves of Reves' bur-
den shifting, which requires that a party using another's funds
prove a note's non-security status."°
2. Criticism of the Reves "Family Resemblance" Test. One con-
sistent complaint regarding Reves concerns the Supreme Court's
Reves... provides lower courts with additional guidance to determine when a
note is a security.... Adopting a separate test for notes wisely and accurately
reflects the inadequacy of attempting to apply uniformly one test to a multitude
of distinct instruments.... Reves ... strengthens the ability to predict whether
a note will fall within the Securities Acts' prohibitions.
Id.; Marc I. Steinberg, Notes as Securities: Reves and its Implications, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
675 (1990) (arguing that Court's decision in Reves, although far from being a model of
clarity, helps to resolve ambiguities in this area) [hereinafter Steinberg, Notes]; Robert M.
Simmons, Note, When Are Notes Securities?: Adding Certainty to the Process of Defining A
Security Under the Federal Securities Laws, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 1119 (1991) ( [Reves] is
easy to apply .... This should add consistency and predictability to the subject.... );
Manning Gilbert Warren, Ill, The Treatment of Reves "Notes" and Other "Securities" Un-
der State Blue Sky Laws, 47 Bus. LAW. 321, 332 (1991) ([Reves, and the adoption of its
test by state courts,] will result in greater uniformity among the states and among the
state and federal regulatory regimes."). See also James D. Alt, Reves v. Ernst & Young.
Demand Notes as "Securities", 4 CAN.-U.S. Bus. L. REV. 255 (1991).
206. See Maura A. Folan, Comment, Supreme Court Adopts Family Resemblance
Test to Determine When a Note is a Security, 25 SUFFOLK L. REV. 895, 903 (1991) ("The
Court correctly attempted to balance the purpose of federal securities regulations and the
need to avoid litigation over instruments clearly not within the purview of the 1934 Act");
Michael A. Lueder, Note, Presuming Notes are Securities, the Supreme Court Adopts its
Own Version of the "Family Resemblance" Test, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 503, 505, 539
(1991) ("[Reves] is a substantial improvement over the circuit courts' previous tests....
[and] has resulted in a practical approach to the analysis of note transactions, while still
providing a degree of flexibility."); Kenneth Schrupp, Comment, The Status of Notes Un-
der the Securities Acts: An Analysis of the Family Resemblance Test, 21 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 387, 400 (1991) ("[Reves] strikes a workable balance between effectuating the legis-
lative intent of the Acts and providing notice to practitioners of the forms of transactions
that are subject to the Acts").
207. Leonard J. DePasquale, Helping to Ameliorate the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor in
the Securities Market, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 893, 916-19 (1992); Christine Ita McGonigle,
Comment, Uncollateralized, Unsecured Demand Notes Sold as an Investment Vehicle Fall
Within Both the "Note" and 'Security" Categories of Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 853, 880 (1991) ("[Reves'] focus ensures that the spirit of the
Securities Acts is fulfilled, while giving deference to the letter of the law.").
208. See Note, When is a Note a Security? A Historical Perspective on the Supreme
Court's Adoption of the Family Resemblance Test, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 371, 395 (1990)
("Placing the burden of showing a non-security on the person seeking to use other per-
sons' money also serves [the Acts policies and purposes."). This author speculates about
why the Supreme Court adopted the "family resemblance" test, and concludes that a pre-
sumption that a note is a security better effectuates the Acts' purpose of providing broad
coverage for the protection of investors, and that a checklist, such as the one that the
Second Circuit crafted, helps to focus judicial analysis. Id. at 391-92.
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failure to provide sufficient guidance as to the amount of weight to
ascribe to the four factors of the "family resemblance" test.20 9 Do any
prongs hold greater weight than the others? Must all factors be met
to find a resemblance, or should lower courts weigh the factors using
a balancing test?
Two commentators criticize Reves for adopting the Second Cir-
cuit's "judicially crafted list of exceptions."210 One criticizes the list
as "finite" and recommends that courts applying Reves ignore the
list and focus instead on the four-factor analysis.21' The other argues
that Congress, in enacting the Securities and Securities Exchange
Acts, erred in adopting an unworkable denotative list of examples of
securities, which the Howey Court corrected by providing a connota-
tive definition to apply. Now Reves, according to this commentator,
is mixing "oil and water" by adopting both denotative and connota-
tive tests. Rather than suggesting that jurists focus solely on the
four factor analysis, this commentator suggests a return to a modi-
fied Howey analysis.212
Another commentator complains that the Reves four-factor
analysis is just a disguised re-hash of the Howey test, and criticizes
the decision as having to have "come from another planet."213 A
similarly harsh article contains all manners of criticism: that (1) the
"family resemblance" test "judicially crafts" a list of exceptions not
based on prior precedent; (2) questioning the seller's motivations
under the four-factor test is inappropriate and may lead to bizarre
results; (3) although the fourth factor of the test, which is supposed
to be used to determine a note's family resemblance, contemplates
an alternative risk-reducing scheme, none of the items on the judi-
cially crafted list of exceptions has an alternative risk-reducing
209. See Museles, supra note 205, at 745-48; Carl W. Schneider & Joshua D. Cohen,
Reves v. Ernst & Young: A Note-Worthy Departure in Defining "Security", 23 REV. SEC.
COMMODITIES REG. 191, 195-96 (1990); Steinberg, Notes, supra note 205, at 679; A His-
torical Perspective, supra note 208, at 393-94; Note, Securities: Is "Any Note" Really a
"Security"? Supreme Court Says "No" in Roves v. Ernst & Young, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 765,
780-82 (1991); Sheryl N. Stephenson, Comment, Uncollateralized Promissory Notes Are
Considered "Securities" To Be Regulated Under Federal Security Laws, 20 U. BALT. L.
REV. 519, 541 (1991).
210. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63.
211. Gene H. Williams, Note, The Continued Demise of the Howey Test: The Su-
preme Court Adopts the "Family Resemblance Test" For Identifying Notes as Securities, 20
STETSON L. REV. 613, 638-39 (1991).
212. Lawrence Page, Note, Even After Reves, Securities Do Not Have Families: Re-
turning to Economic and Legal Realities Through a Connotative Definition of A Security,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 249, 251, 291-93 (1992). The author faults denotative lists of exam-
ples for failing to provide guidance in all situations, and while admitting that connotative
definitions are difficult to craft sufficiently and precisely, avers that they provide better
guidance without the drawing of inconsistent analogies. Id. at 293.
213. Gordon, supra note 157, at 404.
[Vol. 42
1994] MORTGAGE NOTES AS "SECURITIES" 799
scheme; (4) notwithstanding the Marine Bank 14 decision, the Su-
preme Court neglected to add certificates of deposit to its list of ex-
ceptions; and (5) although the majority of notes issued are not se-
curities, the Reves test incorrectly imposes a bias toward finding
one.
215
3. Predictions Regarding Reves' Impact.216 Those commentators
who proffer a prediction are unanimous in their belief that a greater
number of notes will be held to be "securities" after the Reves deci-
sion. 17 Commentators disagree about whether the Reves Court's
footnote, regarding the consideration of interest payments in any
calculation of profit, will have a significant effect.218 Marc Steinberg
argues that the Reves Court's definition of profit is "vitally impor-
tant," and will be interpreted such that in order for a note to have a
"valuable" return, it must pay the holder interest above the prevail-
ing rate. 19 Carl Schneider and Joshua Cohen suggest that:
Virtually every buyer of a note will be motivated by the potential interest
return, which, according to the Court, suggests the existence of a security.
214. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
215. Schneider & Cohen, supra note 209, at 191.
216. Some recent commentators have found inconsistencies in the courts' applica-
tion of Reves' note cases. See Janet Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauer, Reves Revisited, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 1123 (1992); John V. Murray & Anthony F. Vittone, The Banking and Se-
curities Businesses and the Recondite Line Between Them, 110 BANKING L.J. 388 (1993).
217. Schneider and Cohen give this notion only qualified endorsement. Schneider &
Cohen, supra note 209, at 200-02. The cynical commentators predict that:
Notwithstanding the language of Reves, we suspect that, conforming to past
practice, a security almost never will be found when a note (or participation) is
acquired by a bank or other commercial lender in the ordinary course of its
business, or when a natural person issues a note for a non-commercial pur-
pose....
Id. They also point out that "[i]n almost all cases where the purchasers and offerees are
members of the general public, the transaction does involve the sale of a security.. . ." Id.
See also Stephen J. Greenberg & Stephen L. Kibblehouse, Securitization of the Banking
Business: Prime Funds and Asset-Backed Notes, 11 BANKING & COM. LENDING L. 3, 35
(1990); Krabacher, supra note 205, at 1587; Quinn, supra note 151, at 188; Steinberg, su-
pra note 205, at 684-85.
218. The Court's footnote stated:
We emphasize that by "profit" in the context of notes, we mean "a valuable re-
turn on an investment," which undoubtedly includes interest. We have, of
course, defined "profit" more restrictively in applying the Howey test to what
are claimed to be "investment contracts."... To apply this restrictive definition
to the determination whether an instrument is a "note" would be to suggest that
notes paying a rate of interest not keyed to the earning of the enterprise are not
"notes" within the meaning of the Securities Acts. Because the Howey test is ir-
relevant to the issue before us today.., we decline to extend its definition of
"profit" beyond the realm in which that definition applies.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 n.4 (1990) (citations omitted).
219. Steinberg, Notes, supra note 205, at 681.
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We doubt that the buyer's purpose in earning interest will be given the
degree of significance suggested by the Reves opinion in cases where no
security is found, although it probably will be treated as significant when-
ever a security is found.20
In a similarly cynical vein, these commentators go on to predict
that, [als in many other areas of securities law, courts probably will
determine for other reasons what the outcomes should be, and then
the various factors relating to the buyers' state of mind will be re-
cited appropriately in a manner consistent with the result
reached."22'
For this Comment's purposes, the important question is what
effect Reves will have on mortgage notes. Only four commentators
222
speak even minimally to this question.223 The first commentator
predicts in a two sentence summary that, after Reves, the note se-
cured by a mortgage on a principal residence probably will not be
considered a security and, although a fractional interest in the note
may be a security, the note securing the purchase of an investment
property may not be a security. 4
In their short analysis of Reves' application to mortgage notes,
Carl Schneider and Joshua Cohen conclude that in pre-Reves cases,
the identity of the purchaser in a secondary market transaction was
the crucial factor for identification of the underlying notes as secu-
rities. If the purchaser was a commercial lender, then the instru-
ment generally was not a security; if the purchaser was a member of
the general public, then the transaction was a security sale. These
commentators predict that this trend will continue after Reves.2 5
220. Schneider & Cohen, supra note 209, at 199.
221. Id.
222. For a comprehensive discussion of whether "mortgage-backed securities" were
properly characterized as "securities" for Securities Acts purposes, see Paula C. Murray &
Beverly L. Hadaway, Mortgage-Backed Securities: An Investigation of Legal and Finan-
cial Issues, 11 J. CORP. L. 203, 220-34 (1986). Since their article preceded the Supreme
Court's Reves decision, they did not employ a Reves "notes" analysis in comparing mort-
gage notes and the definition of "security."
223. The only commentator to ask the specific question of when real estate interests
are securities, takes no account of the Reves decision. Instead, the author focuses on the
Howey investment/contract analysis, which the Reves Court discredited as it applied to
notes. See James B. Aronoff, When Are Real Estate Interests Securities?, 8 PRAC. REAL
EST. LAW. 77 (1992). It is unknown whether the author deemed the Reves decision of such
little import in the real estate context, and assumed that the Howey analysis would con-
tinue to prevail, or perhaps felt that Reves had not been construed sufficiently for him to
comment upon its implications. The author concludes that "the application of securities
laws depends on the facts of each case and admits of no hard and fast rules." Id. at 85.
Whether this continues to hold true after the Reves decision remains to be seen.
224. Krabacher, supra note 205, at 1586.
225. Schneider & Cohen, supra note 209, at 200-02. They argue:
There are many circumstances in which a whole note or a participation in a
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Park McGinty warns that Reves' rebuttable presumption that
all notes are securities is over-inclusive and economically dangerous.
Using collateralized mortgage obligations as an example, McGinty
distinguishes between investment notes and commercial/consumer
notes, and suggests that the Reves presumption should apply only to
pooled, "securitized" mortgage notes, and not the underlying mort-
gages. 226
John Scribner cites three post-Reves mortgage/security cases,
one with approval, the other two only in passing.227 Perhaps it was
too soon after Reves for Scribner to discern that which is becoming
more apparent with time: that Reves is being applied inconsistently,
not just to mortgage/security cases, but to other note/security cases
as well.228 A discussion of Reves' application to mortgage/security
cases demonstrates this trend.
note is resold by one holder to another. In almost all cases, the underlying notes
were issued in the ordinary course of business to banks, financial institutions,
or other commercial lenders by business borrowers or consumers (the consumer
notes often being secured by a mortgage on residential real estate). The under-
lying notes typically would not be a security in the context of their original issu-
ance. When the notes are resold, the seller typically offers services to the buyer
in collecting and enforcing the notes. Another benefit offered by the seller to en-
hance the value of the notes may be the creation of liquidity through a secon-
dary market. For many thrift institutions, banks, and other commercial lenders,
fees from servicing notes that they originate and sell to others constitute a sig-
nificant source of income.
In almost every relatively recent case where the purchaser is itself a com-
mercial lender, the note or participation (in a note or a pool of notes) involved in
the resale transaction is not a security, even if the retention of servicing by the
seller is a required term of the transaction (and even though "participations" in
other named classes are a named class included in the definition of "security").
In almost all cases where the purchasers and offerees are members of the gen-
eral public, the transaction does involve the sale of a security, even if the servic-
ing package is optional and the investor is given a substantial amount of infor-
mation with which to evaluate the underlying credit and select a particular note
to purchase. These cases well illustrate the general principle that in determining
whether a particular note is a security, the identity and characteristics of the
purchaser may be far more significant than the terms of the note or other formal
characteristics of the transaction.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
226. Park McGinty, What Is A Security?, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1033, 1102-05.
227. John Scribner, Note, Securities: Is 'Any Note" Really a "Security"? Supreme
Court Says "No" in Reves, 44 OKL. L. REV. 765, 779-80 (1991).
228. See, e.g., Kerr & Eisenhauer, supra note 216, at 1123; Murray & Vittone, supra
note 216, at 388.
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IV. APPLYING REVES: ARE MORTGAGE NOTES "SECURITIES"? 229
A. Mortgage/Security Case Law Before and After Reves
Analysis of the reasoning in mortgage/security case law over
the past twenty years offers an idea about how the courts will decide
future cases, expecially those pending or expected in the wake of the
savings and loan crisis.23°
1. Decisional Patterns Demonstrate Only Muted Changes. Fed-
eral mortgage-security decisions may be analyzed in any number of
ways. They may be characterized as pre- or post-Reves cases or by
the type of instrument or transaction involved. The cases also may
be characterized by decisional patterns, i.e., date decided, court
test(s) employed or the ultimate decision in each case."' Such analysis
assumes that all of the transactions involve "mortgage-related instru-
ments." Other commentators might divide the cases between primary
and secondary market transactions. Thus, this Comment only claims
that its categorization process yields a semi-representative
sample, 2 and that the conclusions reached are tentative ones.233
229. The Supreme Court has not had occasion to construe the term "security" under
the federal securities laws in a mortgage note-related context. Its decision in Reves was,
of course, the first time the Court handed down a securities decision concerning a test for
notes at all, much less in the mortgage context.
In one pre-Reves decision, Dinjian v. Dinjian, 495 N.E.2d 882, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 589
(Mass. App. Ct. 1986), Deran Dinjian sued his brother (Karnig) and cousin (Nubar) for,
inter alia, the fraudulent sale of securities, relating to his investment/lending of funds to
his relatives, who were in the habit of lending money to real estate developers, the loans
secured by second mortgages on the subject properties. Thus, this case concerned not the
secondary mortgage market, but rather second mortgages in the primary market. The
court held, reasonably enough, that the notes involved were indicative of simple commer-
cial loan transactions, not sales of securities.
The Arizona Supreme Court in a post-Reves decision rejected the argument that the
Reves test was unconstitutionally vague as it decided that Reves was inapplicable to Ari-
zona criminal securities fraud statutes. A developer had borrowed money for a failed
country club development, selling promissory notes to a number of investors. State v.
Tober, 841 P.2d 206 (Ariz. 1992).
For a review of the definition of "security" as determined in the state courts, see
Douglas M. Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and the
Definition of"Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (1993).
230. Although the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) apparently does not track in-
ternally its litigation by the specific issues therein (such as whether the question of an in-
strument meeting the definition of security is implicated in the case), an informal exami-
nation of the general issues involved in its civil litigation revealed that approximately 10-
15% concerned securities law issues. Telephone Interview with Roberta Babbitt, RTC
Reading Room, Resolution Trust Corporation in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 3, 1994).
231. See infra notes 234-52 and accompanying text.
232. Because these cases cut across so many different types of transactions, it seems
fair to characterize them as representative of the general class, "mortgage-related."
233. Also, some breakdowns would be unpersuasive no matter how they were sliced.
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Nevertheless, the striking patterns and trends that emerge suggest
the likely direction of post-Reves decisionmaking.
2. Classification By Decision Reached. Can any consistent
principles be derived from the case results? While offering some
suggestions, this Comment leaves that decision to the reader. Of the
twenty-three mortgage-security decisions before Reves, eight courts
found securities,24 fourteen did not25 and one court did not decide.236
For example, it is difficult to argue that there is any significance to the fact that the sin-
gle mortgage-security case decided in the District of Columbia Circuit held the presence
of a security. See SEC v. Diversified Indust., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1979).
234. Shults v. Henderson, 625 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 805 F.2d 391
(2d Cir. 1986) (holding that note secured by radio station was a security); First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Mortgage Corp., 467 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala. 1979), affd, 650 F.2d 1376
(5th Cir. Unit B July 1981) (holding that notes and mortgages financing development
project were securities); SEC v. Diversified Indust., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104 (D. D.C. 1979)
(holding that purchase money note for real estate was security); SEC v. Garfinkle, 1978
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,465 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1978) (holding that notes collateral-
ized by mortgages were securities); Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 981 (D.
Neb. 1977) (holding that promissory notes and mortgages were securities); Hall v. Secu-
rity Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974) (holding that notes secured by
mortgages on land were securities); SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184
(S.D.S.D. 1973) (holding that notes secured by Arizona land were securities); SEC v. Lake
Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972) (holding that notes secured by real
property mortgage were securities).
235. First Fin. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d 685
(8th Cir. 1987) (holding that re-sold whole mortgages were not securities); McVay v.
Western Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that participation
notes were not securities); Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985) (holding that promissory note secured by property being
developed was not security); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. May 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (holding that real estate purchase money notes not securi-
ties); AMFAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
promissory notes secured by shopping center being built were not securities); In re Natl
Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Cert. Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(holding that pass-through certificates were not securities); Developer's Mortgage Co. v.
TransOhio Sav. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (holding that participation notes
were not securities); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988),
affd in part and reu'd in part, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 910 F.2d 118
(4th Cir. 1990) (holding that both whole mortgage loans and pass-through certificates
were not securities); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577
(M.D. Tenn. 1987) (holding that re-sold whole mortgages were not securities); Deauville
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp. 513 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(holding that participation notes were not securities); Bank of America Natl Trust & Sav.
Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 595 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that prom-
issory note secured by collateral was not security); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Samuel T.
Issac & Assocs., Inc., 496 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. IM. 1980) (holding that loan participation
notes were not securities); Old Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Waugneux, 484 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D.
Fla. 1980) (holding that notes and mortgages assigned as part of required reserves were
not securities); United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 597
F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that promissory notes in boat-real property exchange
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Of the ten decisions after Reves to date, four courts found securi-
ties,237 five did not,"5 and one court left the question to the jury.239
This may be indicative of a trend for more courts to find mortgage
notes to be securities, given Reves' switch to a rebuttable positive
presumption.
3. Classification By Date of Decision. A date classification yields
more striking evidence for this trend. In the 1970s, seven courts de-
ciding mortgage-security cases found securities, 20 while only two
courts did not.241 In a strong 1980s reversal, only one court found a
security, 2 2 while twelve courts did not.243 Thus far in the 1990s, four
were not securities).
236. Elysian Fed. Say. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp. 737
(D. N.J. 1989) (declining to reach question of whether CMOs and POs were securities).
237. Wright v. Downs, No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992)
(holding that promissory notes secured by second mortgage on property were securities);
Deal v. Asset Management Group, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,244 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
28, 1992) (holding that notes representing investment in renovation of home were securi-
ties); Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990),
affd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding REIT notes and mortgages were securities);
Vicente v. Obenauer, 736 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding that participation notes
were securities).
238. First Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d
510 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that participation note was not a security); Rolo v. City In-
vesting Co. Liquidating Trust, 845 F. Supp. 182 (D. N.J. 1993) (holding that mortgage
notes issued in housing development fraud were not securities); Pollack v. Laidlaw Hold-
ings, Inc., No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), reu'd, 27 F.3d 808
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding that participations and mortgages were not securities); Ford v.
Spartin, No. CIVA. No.92-696, 1992 WL 297432 (D. Md. July 23, 1992) (mem.) (holding
that uncollateralized promissory note for housing developer was not security); Singer v.
Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that promissory note secured by prop-
erty being developed was not a security).
239. Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami, 943 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that is-
sue of whether sale of mortgages and interests in mortgage pools were securities was jury
question).
240. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mortgage Corp., 467 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala.
1979), affd, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981); SEC v. Diversified Indust., Inc.,
465 F. Supp. 104 (D. D.C. 1979); SEC v. Garfinkle, 1978 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,465
(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1978); Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 981 (D. Neb. 1977);
Hall V. Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974); SEC v. Thunderbird
Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.S.D. 1973); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp.
1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
241. United Sports Fishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 597
F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978); AMFAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1978).
242. Shults v. Henderson, 625 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) affd, 805 F.2d 391 (2d
Cir. 1986)
243. First Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d 685
(8th Cir 1987); McVay v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987); Fu-
tura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850
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courts have found a security, five have not, and one has held
"maybe." There is evidence that the Reves decision already has led to
a greater number of mortgage decisions holding that notes are in-
deed securities.
4. Classification By Court. This Comment will not undertake a
comparison among specific circuits, or among the circuit and district
courts. At the federal appellate level, all seven pre-Reves decisions
let stand district court decisions finding no security.' After Reves,
the results essentially are reversed: three post-Reves mortgage-se-
curity appellate decisions have found a security, 5 and one does
not.24 6 This may be where Reves is having its greatest effect.
Some might argue that there is little value to this type of sta-
tistical analysis because "apples and oranges" are being compared.
But to the extent that judicial decisions have mimicked commenta-
tors' predicted outcomes, they are at least worthy of consideration. 7
5. Classification By Test Employed. No mortgage note has ever
been held to constitute a security under the "risk capital" test. Be-
fore Reves, all six courts using that test in the mortgage context said
"no."248 After Reves, the test has not been used. Under the Howey in-
(1985); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. May 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981); Developer's Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Say. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio
1989); In re Natl Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Cert. Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497
(C.D. Cal. 1989); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988);
Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Tenn. 1987);
Deauville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp. 513 (C.D. Cal.
1986); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 595 F.
Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Samuel T. Issac & Assocs., Inc. 496
F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Old Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Waugerneux, 484 F. Supp 1302
(S.D. Fla. 1980)
244. First Fin. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d 685
(8th Cir. 1987); McVay v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987); Fu-
tura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985);
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. May), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); AM-
FAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Epic Mortgage
Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, Foremost
Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1990); United Sportfishers v.
Buffo, 396 F. Supp 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 597 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978).
245. Wright v. Downs, No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992); Mer-
cer v. Jaffe, Snyder, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd, 933
F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991).
246. First Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d
510 (9th Cir. 1990).
247. This is especially so when one considers that the commentators were writing
about "notes" as securities in general, and were not confining their analyses to "mortgage
notes," as this Comment does.
248. First Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d 685
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vestment contract or investment/commercial tests, almost a third of
the cases before Reves found a security. 9 Interestingly, courts em-
ploying the "family resemblance" test before Reves found a security
by a ratio of three-to-one. 50 After Reves, this ratio is one-to-one.
251
6. Classification By Type of Instrument. The above analysis
suggests that after the Supreme Court adopted the "family resem-
blance" test in 1990, courts interpreting the securities laws in the
mortgage-security context have been persuaded to move away from
(8th Cir. 1987); AMFAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978); In
re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Cert. Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D.
Cal. 1989); Developer's Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Say. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.
Ohio 1989); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D.
Tenn. 1987); Deauville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp.
513 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
249. For courts finding a security, see Shults v. Henderson, 625 F. Supp. 1419
(W.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 805 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1986); First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mort-
gage Corp., 467 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala. 1979), affd, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. Unit B July
1981); Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 981 (D. Neb. 1977); Hall v. Security
Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F.
Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972). But see First Fin. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. E.F. Hutton
Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1987); McVay v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 823
F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987); Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. May 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Cert.
Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989); Developer's Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Say.
Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio 1989); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp.
1192 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say.
Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1990); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667
F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Tenn. 1987); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rit-
tenhouse Assocs., 595 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Old Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Waugneux,
484 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Samuel T. Issac & Assocs.,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980); United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310
(S.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 597 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978).
250. See, e.g., Shults v. Henderson, 625 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 805
F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1986); SEC v. Diversified Indust., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104 (D. D.C. 1979);
SEC v. Garfinkle, 1978 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,465 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1978). But see
Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Financial Serv. Corp., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Tenn.
1987).
251. For examples of courts finding a security under the "family resemblance" test
after Reves, see Wright v. Downs, No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992);
Deal v. Asset Management Group, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 97,244 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
28, 1992); Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich.
1990), affd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991); Vicente v. Obenauer, 736 F. Supp. 679 (E.D.
Va. 1990). But see First Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co.,
919 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1990); Role v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 845 F. Supp.
182 (D. N.J. 1993); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994); Ford v. Spartin, No. CIV.A.
No.92-696, 1992 WL 297432 (D. Md. July 23, 1992) (mem.); Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp.
1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). One post-Reves court left the question to the jury. See supra note
239.
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their leniency of the 1980s-though they have not fully returned to
their strictness of the 1970s-and after Reves, at least when the case
involves mortgages, are just as likely to find a security as not.
As to whether this conclusion holds true for those cases con-
cerning instruments and transactions historically associated with
the secondary mortgage market, all three pre-Reves courts consider-
ing whether sales of whole mortgage loans constituted sales of
"securities" held that they did not." 2 No court after Reves has
reached the issue. Regarding loan participations and mortgages, one
court before Reves may have held that a loan participation was a se-
curity.253 Four courts before Reves" 4 have held that a mortgage loan
participation is not a security. After Reves, courts have split on the
issue. 5
Thus, the EPIC court's 1988 pronouncement, that courts
"uniformly hold that the purchase and sale of whole loans and loan
participations... do not involve securities,"" is no longer true.
Nevertheless, after Reves, courts still are sympathetic to the idea
that these instruments are not securities.
Concerning those instruments most commonly known as
"mortgage-backed securities," only one pre-Reves court has decided
252. See, e.g., First Fin. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834
F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1987); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va.
1988); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs. Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Tenn.
1987). No post-Reues court has reached this issue, although one may soon. See infra part
V for a discussion of the Permanent Savings Bank case pending in the Western District of
New York.
253. SEC v. Garfinkle, 1978 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,465 (S.D.N.Y. June 9,
1978) (concerning the refinancing of a loan participation). It is unclear from the court's
decision whether a participation interest still existed at the time the plaintiff brought
suit.
254. See, e.g., McVay v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987);
Developer's Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Say. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Ohio 1989);
Deauville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp. 513 (C.D. Cal.
1986); Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Samuel T. Isaac & Assoc., Inc., 496 F. Supp. 831 (N.D.
Ill. 1980).
255. See, e.g., Vimcente v. Obenauer, 736 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1990). But see First
Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d 510 (9th Cir.
1990); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
21, 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994).
256. In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F.Supp. 1192, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd
in part and rev'd in part, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Sav. Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4th
Cir. 1990).
257. Although the Second Circuit recently overturned a lower court decision that
held mortgage loan participations were not securities, this Circuit's Reves analysis is fact
specific and easily might go the other way with a few factual differences. See Pollack v.
Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'g No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993).
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the issue:28 In Re National Mortgage25 9 held that mortgage-backed
pass-through certificates260 were not "securities" under federal sec-
urities laws. After Reves, the district court in Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider,
Raitt and Heuer, P.C.26' held that REIT shares claimed to have been
sold fraudulently were securities. In Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami,262
the Fourth Circuit left the issue up to the jury.
7. Classification By Plaintiff. Before Reves, when the plaintiff
was, or represented, a financial institution, only three courts held
that the instruments were securities,2 63 and eleven did not.26 When
the suit was brought on behalf of individuals or small developers,
five pre-Reves courts found securities,265 and three did not. 6
After Reves, only one court has decided a mortgage/security
case where the plaintiff was a financial institution. This court did
not find a security. 7 Where the plaintiff note buyers were indi-
258. Another pre-Reves court did not decide the question of whether CMOs and POs
were securities. See Elysian v. First Interregional, 713 F.Supp. 737 (D.N.J. 1989).
259. 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
260. Mortgage-backed, pass-through certificates are one of the quintessential secon-
dary market "securities."
261. 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th Cir. 1991).
262. 943 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1991).
263. See, e.g., Shults v. Henderson, 625 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D.N.Y.), affd, 805 F.2d
391 (2d Cir. 1986); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mortgage Corp., 467 F. Supp. 943
(N.D. Ala. 1979), af/d, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981); SEC v. Garfinkle, 1978
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,465 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1978).
264. First Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d 685
(8th Cir. 1987); Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 850 (1985); AMFAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir.
1978); In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Cert. Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497
(C.D. Cal. 1989); Developer's Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Sav. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570
(S.D. Ohio 1989); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd
in part and rev'd in part, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Sav. Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4th
Cir. 1990); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Tenn.
1987); Deauville Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp. 513
(C.D. Cal. 1986); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs.,
595 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Samuel T. Issac & Assocs.,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Old Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Waugneux, 484 F. Supp.
1302 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
265. SEC v. Diversified Indust., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104 (D. D.C. 1979); Lingenfelter v.
Title Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. 981 (D. Neb. 1977); Hall v. Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371
F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974); SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.S.D.
1973); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
266. McVay v. Western Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987); William-
son v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. May), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); United
Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 597 F.2d 658 (9th Cir.
1978).
267. First Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen Bank and Trust Co., 919 F.2d
510 (9th Cir. 1990).
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viduals, the post-Reves decisions are split five-to-four," with one
decision leaving the issue to the jury.26
If there is a conclusion to be drawn from this, it seems that a
financial institution bears a more significant burden than the "little
guy" in persuading a court that the mortgage note it purchased was
a security under the securities laws.
B. Judicial Quixotism and Inconsistent Application Mute Reves'
Impact
Generally, the post-Reves cases have been consistent in their
selection of the proper test for evaluating mortgage-related note
transactions, namely, the Reves note analysis. 70 Nevertheless, the
cases have yet to demonstrate consistency in their application of the
Reves formula. After Reves, the crucial question for mortgage-rela-
ted notes in the securities fraud context is whether they will be
found to bear a strong family resemblance to a particular exception
adopted from the Second Circuit and carved out in Reves: What is
the meaning of the phrase, "the note secured by a mortgage on a
home"?27'
1. Inconsistencies Abound In Application of Any of the Tests For
a "Security," Including the Reves Test. Schneider and Cohen pre-
dicted that, "[als in many other areas of securities law, courts prob-
ably will determine for other reasons what the outcomes should be,
and then the various factors relating to the buyers' state of mind will
be recited appropriately in a manner consistent with the result
reached."272 Even though the majority of the cases discussed in this
Comment contain internally consistent reasoning, the many incon-
sistencies among decisions before and after Reves render such a
cynical prediction accurate.
On virtually all the cases' decisional sub-issues, one can find
268. For cases finding a security, see Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808
(2d Cir. 1994), rev'g No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993); Wright v.
Downs, No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992); Deal v. Asset Management
Group, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,244 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 28, 1992); Mercer v. Jaffe,
Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990), affd, 933 F.2d 1008 (6th
Cir. 1991); Vicente v. Obenauer, 736 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1990).
For cases finding no security, see Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 845 F.
Supp. 182 (D. N.J. 1993); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL
17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994); Ford v. Spartin, No.
CIV.A. No.92-696, 1992 WL 297432 (D. Md. July 23, 1992) (mem.); Singer v. Livoti, 741 F.
Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
269. Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami, 943 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1991).
270. See id.
271. Reves, 494 U.S. 56, 65 (1990).
272. Schneider & Cohen, supra note 209, at 199.
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authority for opposing positions.
* Loan Administration: Does the seller's servicing of the loan
represent a managerial function, leading to the conclusion that the
transaction instrument was a security? Or are such after-purchase
servicings purely administrative in nature, leading to a negative
conclusion?273
According to the pre-Reves, First Federal24 court, a "servicing
agreement" whereby the seller collected payments and handled ad-
ministrative matters indicated the presence of a security. But ac-
cording to the pre-Reves, In Re National Mortgage,27 First Finan-
cial27 6 and EPIC277 courts, such servicing agreements represent only
administrative functions, not entrepreneurial or managerial ones,
and there was no security. The post-Reves courts have not yet
reached this issue.
• Risk Reduction: Do collateral, mortgage insurance, seller
guarantees or state and local mortgage statutes provide sufficient
risk reduction so that the protection of the securities laws is unnec-
essary? Or must the protective scheme consist of other federal legis-
lation?78
Before Reves, only two cases, Home Savings279 and In Re Na-
tional Mortgage,' addressed this issue. Both decided that collateral,
seller guarantees and insurance provided sufficient protection. After
Reves, seven courts discussed this issue. Mercer2' stated in dicta
that collateralization might be sufficient, while Singer2 2 and Pol-
lack21 held that state and local mortgage statutes were sufficient.
However, the Wright28 and Deal' courts disagreed, cautioning that
273. Fees for servicing loans, set by the servicer and often taxed separately from the
mortgage loan sale, can be quite lucrative for the loan administrators. Therefore, many
thrifts buy and sell mortgage loans less not only to realize a profit from the sale, but also
to gain a profit from the fees for servicing the loans. Lee A. Sheppard, Tax Questions
Raised By Mortgage-Backed Securities, 47 TAX NOTES, May 28, 1990, at 1041-42.
274. 467 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala. 1979), affd, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. Unit B July
1981).
275. 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
276. 834 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1987).
277. 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, Foremost
Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Sav. Bank, 910 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1990).
278. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558 (1982).
279. 496 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
280. 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
281. 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
282. 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
283. No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 808
(2d Cir. 1994).
284. Wright v. Downs, No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992).
285. Deal v. Asset Management Group, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,244 (N.D.
IIl. Aug 28, 1992).
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state laws were not what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
spoke of an alternative risk-reduction scheme in Reves. Finally,
Vicente simply found no risk-reducing factors.2 s
9 Fixed Return of Interest: Does a fixed interest return repre-
sent profit, thus indicating a security? The pre-Reves mortgage-se-
curity cases overwhelmingly held that it did not.27 One early pre-
Reves decision, SEC v. Havasu,m held that fixed interest was profit.
After Reves the balance has shifted, probably due to a Reves
footnote, the importance of which the commentators have dis-
puted.28 9 Five post-Reves courts, Mercer,29 Wright,291 Deal,2 92
Vicente29" and Pollack on appeal 294 have held that a fixed rate of in-
terest is profit indicating a security. Only one post-Reves mortgage
note decision, the district court's decision in Pollack,295 holds other-
wise.
* Concerns About Securities Law Subsuming Real Estate Law:
Three pre-Reves courts and one post-Reves court make this argu-
ment against defining real estate notes as "securities."2 96 Another
286. Vicente v. Obenauer, 736 F. Supp. 679, 693 (E.D. Va. 1990).
287. See First Fin. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d
685 (8th Cir. 1987); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988),
affd in part and rev'd in part, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 910 F.2d 118
(4th Cir. 1990); Deauville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 648 F. Supp.
513 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Samuel T. Isaac & Assocs., Inc., 496 F.
Supp. 831 (N.D. Ill. 1980). One pre-Reues decision, United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396
F.Supp. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 597 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1978), even held that apprecia-
tion in value does not equal profit!
288. 340 F. Supp. 1318 (D. Minn. 1972).
289. In footnote four, the Court stated:
We emphasize that by "profit" in the context of notes, we mean "a valuable re-
turn on an investment," which undoubtedly includes interest. We have, of
course, defined "profit' more restrictively in applying the Howey test to what
are claimed to be "investment contracts."... To apply this restrictive definition
to the determination whether an instrument is a "note" would be to suggest that
notes paying a rate of interest not keyed to the earning of the enterprise are not
"notes" within the meaning of the Securities Acts. Because the Howey test is ir-
relevant to the issue before us today... we decline to extend its definition of
"profit" beyond the realm in which that definition applies.
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 67 n.4 (1990); see discussion supra Part II.D.
290. 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
291. No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992).
292. 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,244 (N.D. IMI. Aug 28, 1992).
293. 736 F. Supp. 679, 693 (E.D. Va. 1990).
294. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994).
295. No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 808
(2d Cir. 1994).
296. For pre-Reves decisions, see Futura Dev. Corp. v. Centex Corp., 761 F.2d 33
(1st Cir. 1985); Old Security Life Ins. Co. v. Waugneux, 484 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Fla.
1980); United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310 (S.D. Cal. 1975), affd, 597 F.2d 658
(9th Cir. 1978). But see Singer v. Livoti, 714 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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pre-Reves court simply rejects the argument as unworthy of con-
cern.
29 7
- Does a Specific Reference, or Omission of One, to the Sale of
"Securities" By the Seller Indicate the Presence of a "Security" Under
the Statutes?: One pre-Reves case, AMFAC Mortgage Corporation,298
and two post-Reves cases, Mercer299 and Deal,300 held that it did.
Nevertheless, one of the pre-Reves decisions held differently. In Re
National Mortgage31' held that even though the purchased, mort-
gage-backed pass-through certificates were labeled "securities," the
buyers were sophisticated enough to have been able to look beyond
the labeling and determine the truth themselves.0 2
a Did the Buyer's Opportunity to Negotiate Aspects of the Sale
Indicate the Presence of a "Security"?: After Reves, one court has
reached this question. 3 There are inconsistent decisions at the pre-
Reves level. In accordance with Marine Bank3 4 and Great Western
Bank & Trust v. Kotz,315 most of the courts considering this issue be-
fore Reves have viewed the opportunity to negotiate as indicative of
a commercial transaction that represents no sale of security. One
pre-Reves decision, First Federal,0 6 held that the opportunity to ne-
gotiate meant an interest in assuring eventual profit, thus indicat-
ing the presence of a security.
* Does the Family Resemblance Exception, "Note Secured By A
Mortgage On A Home," Mean Just A Primary Market Loan For An
Individual Residence, Or May Its Meaning Be Stretched Further?:
Both the pre- and post-Reves cases are split on this issue. Before Re-
yes, three decisions, Diversified,07 Shults,08 and Garfinkle,"9 held to
a strict, literal interpretation of this phrase. The Home Guaranty
court310 stated that "note secured by a mortgage on a home" could
encompass notes secured by multiple townhouse units. 1'
After Reves, the courts are also split. Mercer,312 Ford,313 and
297. SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.S.D. 1973).
298. 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978).
299. 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
300. 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 197,244 (N.D. Ill. Aug 28, 1992).
301. 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
302. Id. at 503.
303. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 813 (2d Cir. 1994).
304. 455 U.S. 551, 560 (1982).
305. 532 F.2d 1252, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 1976).
306. 467 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
307. 465 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1979).
308. 625 F. Supp. 1419 (W.D.N.Y. 1986).
309. 1978 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 96,465 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1978).
310. 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
311. Id. at 581-82.
312. 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
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Wright314 call for a strict interpretation, while Singer,1 5 Pollack,316
and Ro 3 17 allow that "a home" could encompass a note secured by a
number of homes, or even small commercial properties. The Deal15
court also seems willing to entertain this suggestion.
9 Does a Loan of Short Duration Indicate a Commercial, Non-
"Security" Loan, While a Longer Duration Loan Indicates a Security
Investment?: The majority of the courts that have considered this
question in the mortgage-security context reach the traditional con-
clusion, namely, that short-term loans are commercial and long-term
loans are investments .3 9 However, two pre-Reves courts, Deauville320
and In re National Mortgage,32' held that the duration of the loan
was of little significance.
* Does the Buyer's Sophistication Matter?: The relevant pre-Re-
yes decisions hold unanimously that it does, and that the purchase
of mortgage-backed instruments by sophisticated financial institu-
tions militates against finding a security.32 2 The only post-Reves de-
cision discussing the issue, the district court's decision in Pollack,3
held by negative implication that where unsophisticated purchasers
were affected, the instruments in question likely were securities.
Nevertheless, the district court in Pollack gave this factor little
weight, finding that where the other three Reves factors suggested
that the instruments were securities, the "harm to an unsophisti-
cated purchaser" factor would give way.
313. No. CIV.A.92-696, 1992 WL 297432 (D. Md. July 23, 1992).
314. No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992).
315. 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
316. No. 90 Civ. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), reu'd, 27 F.3d 808
(2d Cir. 1994).
317. 845 F. Supp. 182 (D.N.J. 1994).
318. 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,244 (N.D. Ill. Aug 28, 1992).
319. For pre-Reves cases, see AMFAC Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426
(9th Cir. 1978); Developer's Mortgage Co. v. TransOhio Say. Bank, 706 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.
Ohio 1989); First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Mortgage Corp., 467 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Ala.
1979), afl'd, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981). For the post-Reves case, see Singer
v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Indeed, the Securities Exchange Act exempts
from the definition of security instruments with a maturity under nine months. See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1988).
320. 648 F. Supp. 513 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
321. 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
322. See In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Cert. Sec. Litig., 723 F.
Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va.
1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 910
F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1990); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp.
577 (M.D. Tenn. 1987); Deauville Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Westwood Say. & Loan Ass'n, 648
F. Supp. 513 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
323. No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993).
324. In overruling the district court, the Second Circuit in Pollack gave the buyer's
sophistication much greater weight. Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 813
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2. Proper Test Application. Of course, the pre-Reves cases ap-
plied a number of different tests to the issue of whether a note is a
security. The Reves Court attempted to impose uniformity in the test
to be applied. Unfortunately, the post-Reves, Zolfaghari court, in
concluding that the instruments in question may not have been
notes, declined to apply a Reves analysis and thereby departed from
this uniformity goal.32 5
The pre-Reves courts were extraordinarily inconsistent in their
application of the securities statutes to mortgage-related note trans-
actions. This inconsistency is to be expected, since before Reves the
courts employed at least three different tests, as well as hybrids.
What is surprising, and troubling, is that inconsistency still charac-
terizes judicial reasoning in this area, even though the majority of
post-Reves courts are uniformly applying the proper Reves four-fac-
tor analysis.
It would be simplistic to explain away the post-Reves inconsis-
tencies by declaring that the cases are fact-specific and thus decided
differently on their facts. The truth is that even where similar facts
are involved, the test itself is being applied inconsistently. This has
troubling implications for those who oversee the securities laws or
practice in the securities area. Assuming that this state of affairs is
likely to continue, the Supreme Court soon may wish to consider
tightening its Reves four-factor test, and address those issues that
continually are decided differently. 26 The SEC or Congress also may
wish to act in order to ensure more consistency in these decisions.
3. The Second Circuit May Be Applying Its Own Test Less Rig-
orously. Before Reves, those courts applying the "family resem-
blance" test found securities by a margin of three-to-one. Both Sec-
ond Circuit decisions before Reves held that mortgage notes were
securities, and two other circuit courts trying out the "family re-
semblance" test split. 27
Of the ten courts applying the "family resemblance" test to
(1994).
325. 943 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1991).
326. These factors include: loan administration, types of risk reduction, interest as
profit, concern about securities law's subsumption of real estate law, instrument labeling,
opportunities to negotiate, boundaries of the phrase "note secured by a mortgage on a
home," loan duration and the buyer's sophistication. Though the courts rely on and find
dispositive these subfactors underlying the Reves four-factor analysis, courts often ana-
lyze these factors differently.
327. For cases in the Second Circuit, see Shults v. Henderson, 625 F. Supp. 1419
(W.D.N.Y.), affd, 805 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1986) (yes), and SEC v. Garfinkle, 1978 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,465 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1978) (yes); see also Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v.
Third Fin. Serv., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (no); SEC v. Diversified In-
dust., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1979) (yes).
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mortgage note-security cases after Reves, five have found securities
and five have not. Two of the five post-Reves decisions that did not
find a security came out of district courts in the Second Circuit,
namely, Singer"m and Pollack.329 If one accepts the premise that the
circuit that (1) created the "family resemblance" test, and (2) applied
it more often than any other circuit, may be looked to for guidance in
determining how the test is to be applied; then one must conclude
that trends within that circuit may have some bearing on whether
mortgage-related instruments are deemed "securities" in the future.
After Reves, at the Second Circuit's district court level, both
mortgage-related securities cases used the Reves "family resem-
blance" test to hold that no security existed. Only one such case has
been decided at the Second Circuit's appellate level.330 There are in-
dications from related cases decided there that the Second Circuit
may hesitate to find "securities" under the "family resemblance" test
for mortgage-backed instruments, unless a dispositive subfactor,
such as buyer sophistication, points overwhelmingly in that direc-
tion. An interlocutory appeal was certified in Pollack, because the
court found that the question of whether mortgage participations
are securities is an issue "on the fringe of the law."33 ' Dicta in other
cases highlight situations in which the Second Circuit may not find
the presence of a security.
4. Securities Industry Association v. Clarke.332 The Securities
Industry Association, a national trade association representing in-
vestment bankers and securities brokers, asked the Comptroller of
the Currency to review for banking improprieties1 3 the Security
328. 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
329. No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 808
(2d Cir. 1994).
330. Shortly before this Comment was published, the Second Circuit reversed Pol-
lack, holding that the mortgage participations at issue were securities. Pollack v. Laidlaw
Holdings, Inc., 27 F.3d 808, 813 (1994). The decision is fact-specific, and its influence
might be limited to situations involving the particular types of mortgage instruments and
their sales context. However, the case is more interesting, and likely to be more influen-
tial, for its analysis of the nine subfactors, identified in this Comment, that the courts
employing the Reves test continue to analyze inconsistently. Pollack discusses seven of
the nine subfactors. See supra note 326. Only two of the subfactors, loan duration and in-
strument labeling, are inapparent.
If the losing appellees should seek certification of the issue to the Supreme Court,
the Court would have an ideal opporunity to clarify its Reves decision, in terms of both
the weighing of the Reves factors and the ambiguities inherent in the mortgage note con-
text.
331. No. 90 CIV. 5799, 1993 WL 254932, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1993).
332. 885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
333. Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the definition of "security"
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Pacific National Bank's issuance of $194 million worth of mortgage
pass-through certificates. The SPN Bank, upon issuing the mort-
gage-backed securities, had issued a prospectus and registered the
issue with the SEC, thus accepting that the instruments in question
did constitute "securities" under the federal laws at the time they
were issued.3 m
The Comptroller of the Currency, responding to the SIA, wrote
as follows:
The Bank's program, as described in the Prospectus and Prospectus Sup-
plement dated January 23, 1987, is squarely based on long-standing
precedent that is fully supported by applicable law and subsequent court
decisions interpreting these laws. In pooling its mortgage loans and sell-
ing interests therein, the Bank is merely engaging in a permitted sale of
its mortgage assets. We cannot conclude that the Glass-Steagall Act is in-
tended to preclude banks from conducting this activity.335
The SIA brought suit in federal court, seeking to overturn the
Comptroller's decision. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for SIA,13 and the Comptroller and the SPN Bank appealed.
Although this case concerns mortgage-backed security sales
and the banking law, the decision has security law resonance due to
the appellate court's dicta. In ruling for SPN Bank and the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Second Circuit criticized the district
court's reasoning as flawed because it analyzed the question of
whether the pass-through certificates were "securities" under the
Glass-Steagall banking laws by employing tests for the definition of
"security" under the securities laws. The Second Circuit criticized
the lower court's reasoning:
[Tihe district court appeared to give determinative significance to the sale
of the mortgage loans under SPN Bank's plan, by means of the pool in-
stead of individually [citation omitted]. The mere fact that the certificate
mechanism was used to sell otherwise salable mortgage loans transformed
the transaction, in the district court's view, into the unlawful
"underwriting of securities." The district court erred in attributing such
significance to SPN Bank's pooling of the mortgages and sale of certifi-
cates.
337
The Second Circuit overturned the district court's conclusion that a
as that term is used in Glass-Steagall, see Mary Margaret Kuck, Note, Mortgage-Backed
Securities and Consumer Related Receivables: A Lesson From the Past With An Eye To.
ward The Future, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 227 (1988).
334. Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1052.
335. Id. at 1038.
336. Securities Indust. Assoc. v. Clarke, 703 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), vacated,
885 F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
337. Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1050.
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banking securities claim would lie. Although admittedly this deci-
sion is under banking and not securities law, the court's dicta that
pooled, mortgage pass-through certificates may not be securities,
even under a securities law analysis, may be telling.
5. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pacific National
Bank.33 Loan participation mortgage note decisions are one of the
few areas of mortgage note law where decisions are nearly unani-
mous, because the courts have been nearly unanimous on the larger
issue, i.e., whether loan participations that one bank or financial
institution sells to another are securities. Generally, they are not.139
Banco Espanol has been widely criticized, 340 and when called
upon to ascertain the security status of mortgage loan participa-
tions, the Second Circuit took pains to distinguish the cases on the
basis of the relative sophistication of the investors involved.
In 1988, SPN Bank extended a line of credit to Integrated Re-
sources, Inc., so that Integrated was able to borrow short-term unse-
cured loans from SPN. Security Pacific sold these loans, in whole or
in part, to various institutional investors at varying interest rates;
that is, they sold loan participations.
Later that year, Integrated began experiencing financial prob-
lems. SPN Bank soon refused to extend Integrated any more credit.
Nevertheless, SPN continued to sell loan participations on Inte-
grated's debt. Integrated began defaulting on its loans and even-
tually declared bankruptcy.
Two sets of investors who had purchased loan participations
brought suit against SPN, contending that the loan participations
were "securities" under the Securities Acts. The district court ruled
that the participations were not securities, and granted summary
judgment to SPN Bank." The plaintiffs appealed.
The Second Circuit applied the Reves four-factor analysis,
agreeing with the district court's conclusions:
(1) Motivation-the court held that SPN was motivated by a desire to
increase lines of credit to Integrated while diversifying its own risk, and
that Integrated was motivated by the need to acquire short-term credit to
338. 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
339. Robert L. Tortoriello, Securities Law Implications of Loan Sale Transactions,
INSIGHTS, Oct. 1991, at 7.
340. See, e.g., Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, What Is a Security?, 24 N.Y.
L.J. 3 (1992); Loan Participations Are Not Securities Under 1933 Act, Appeals Court Con-
cludes, 59 Bank. Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 27 (July 6, 1992); SEC Urges Rehearing of Second
Circuit Ruling Short-Term Loan Notes Not Securities, 24 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 35,
at 1420 (Aug. 28, 1992).
341. Banco Espanol de Credito v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
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finance its current operations. Thus, the transaction was a commercial
one.
(2) Plan of Distribution-there was no common trading, just a 'limited
solicitation to sophisticated financial or commercial institutions and not to
the general public."3 Additionally, resales of the loan participations were
prohibited, thus limiting eligible buyers to the non-general public.
(3) Public Expectations-the sophisticated purchasers had ample notice
that they were buying participations in loans, not investments in a busi-
ness enterprise.
(4) Alternative Regulatory Scheme-the Comptroller of the Currency
had issued specific policy guidelines regarding the sale of loan participa-
tions; thus, application of the securities laws was unnecessary.
Thus the court held that under the Reves analysis, the loan partici-
pations at issue had a strong family resemblance to "the enumerated
category of loans issued by banks for commercial purposes" and were
not "securities." 3
Judge Oakes dissented, declaring that "the majority opinion
misreads the facts, makes bad banking law and bad securities law,
and stands on its head the law of this circuit and of the Supreme
Court in [Reves v. Ernst & Young]."3 Judge Oakes pointed out that
the SEC had submitted an amicus curiae brief, which the majority
had not mentioned, supporting a designation of the loan participa-
tions as "securities." These loan notes differed from traditional loan
participations in that traditionally, participations are negotiated
one-to-one by the parties, while in Banco Espanol, the participants
were not supplied sufficient information.
Additionally, the dissent stated that the SPN-issued participa-
tions resembled investments in their promotion. As to the investors
being "sophisticated," Judge Oakes declared that "[tihe fact that the
purchasers here were sophisticated entities does not exclude them
from being considered a 'broad segment of the public'."
Given its reliance in both Banco Espanol and Pollack on buyer
sophistication as a largely dispositive issue, the Second Circuit ef-
fectively may supplant the Reves analysis, which was adapted from
its own "family resemblance" test, with a new note analysis that
hinges on only one of the Reves factors. If decided, a case now pend-
ing in the Western District of New York also may hinge on the
342. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 55.
343. Id. at 56. Note that another circuit court after Reves has used this Reves excep-
tion in the mortgage/security realm. In First Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Worthen
Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1990), the court found that a note underlying a
loan to a developer for improvement of real property met the Reves exception for a loan by
a commercial bank to finance business development. Id. at 515.
344. Banco Espanol, 973 F.2d at 56.
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buyer's sophistication issue.
6. Permanent Savings Bank v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc.4' In the mid-1980s, Permanent Savings Bank, through
intermediary Merrill Lynch, purchased from Landbank Equity Cor-
poration $8 million worth of two pools of high-yield mortgage pass-
through notes. 46 The notes were insured by Lloyd's of London, but
the insurance later proved illusory as a result of an indemnification
agreement between Lloyd's and Landbank. After Landbank went
into bankruptcy, and Permanent became insolvent, the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was substituted as the named
plaintiff. Permanent (now FDIC) brought suit against Merrill Lynch,
alleging misrepresentation under the securities laws in the broker-
ing of a sale of "securities." Merrill Lynch responded that the mort-
gage notes do not meet the securities law definition of "securities."
Both sides have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on this
issue, upon which the court has not ruled.- 7
e Plaintiffs Arguments. The plaintiff relies heavily on Mercer'48
throughout its argument, contending that the context in which the
purchase was made, i.e., the secondary mortgage market,
"completely alters the analysis of all four Reves factors." 49 Addi-
tionally, the plaintiff also argues as a policy matter that the federal
securities laws are well designed to regulate the secondary mortgage
market and traditionally have been applied to such transactions.350
Regarding the Reves four-factor analysis, the plaintiff claims:
(1) Motivation-that its motive was to gain profit in the form of inter-
est, and the seller's motivation concerned receiving pool servicing fees to
use in its general business operations.
345. No. 86-0713C (W.D.N.Y. argued Dec. 15, 1991). As of this writing, this case is
on hold due to discussions regarding a broader settlement between Merrill Lynch and the
FDIC.
346. The plaintiff describes these notes as providing a blended interest rate, and as
pass-through certificates. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Law In Support of
Motion For Summary Judgment at 9, 11, Permanent Sat. Bank (No. 86-0713C).
347. The plaintiff also alleges RICO violations. The defendants have responded with
a statute of limitations defense, which will not be discussed here. The threshold issue in
the case is whether the mortgage instruments in question represent "securities."
348. 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
349. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 9, Permanent Sat. Bank (No.
86-0713C).
350. The plaintiff offers no authority in support of this strong assertion. Interest-
ingly, rather than being concerned that real estate law is at risk of being subsumed by se-
curities law, about which some courts and commentators worry, see, e.g., Singer v. Livoti,
714 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) and Bradner, supra note 18, at 977, the plaintiff is con-
cerned that Reves not supplant securities law. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of
Law at 9, Permanent Sat. Bank (No. 86-0713C).
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(2) Plan of Distribution-that there was a moderately sized private
placement with sales to ten institutional investors.
(3) Public Expectations-that it made two investments in two pools of
loans, not a series of purchases of hundreds of individual mortgages.
Plaintiff also claims that the reasonable expectation of sophisticated insti-
tutional investors in making purchases in the secondary mortgage market
is that they are buying securities.
(4) Alternative Regulatory Scheme-that the available risk reduction
schemes were insufficient, given that the insurance proved to be illusory,
and state mortgage regulation does not constitute adequate protection.
The plaintiff also argues that while it may have had some con-
trol over the acceptance or rejection of individual mortgages in the
pool, the pools it purchased were subject to servicing agreements
that afforded Permanent no managerial discretion . 51 But the plain-
tiff next contends that it relied on Landbank to do its investigating,
leading to speculation that its losses on the transactions derived not
from misrepresentation in the sale, but from neglect on the part of
Permanent to effectively use its power of review over the individual
mortgages. 352
* Defendant's Responses. The defendant argues that Mercer is
distinguishable,53 since the case at bar involves no offering of
"securities" by prospectus and no offering to the general public. In-
stead, a sophisticated bank in the mortgage loan business purchased
a quantity of individual mortgages, each of which was individually
reviewed and accepted by the plaintiff on terms individually nego-
tiated by the plaintiff and Landbank.
The defendant also contends that Singer v. Livoti3l supports its
position, since the extensive negotiation that took place character-
izes the transaction as a traditional, private commercial one. Con-
cerning the fourth Reves factor, the defendant points to Singer's ac-
ceptance of professional licensing as a risk reduction factor which
was in effect during the transaction in the case at bar,355 and argues
that the failure of the insurance does not render the insurance a
non-risk reducer. Concerning the first Reves factor, i.e., motivation,
the defendant relies on Banco EspanoJ55 for the proposition that a
351. Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 25-26, Permanent Say. Bank (No. 86-
0713C).
352. Id. at 27-28.
353. Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law To Plaintiffs Supplemental Memoran-
dum of Law at 5, Permanent Say. Bank (No. 86-0713C).
354. 741 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
355. Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law To Plaintiffs Supplemental Memoran-
dum of Law at 7, Permanent Say. Bank (No. 86-0713C).
356. 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2992 (1993).
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fixed rate of interest is the likely motivation for a commercial, not
investment, transaction.
The defendant's strongest argument concerns the second and
third Reves factors, plan of distribution and public expectations.
Permanent purchased loans and mortgages after negotiation and
individual review."' Although the defendant concedes that Land-
bank did sell mortgages to other banks, the transaction in the case
at bar was "an individually negotiated agreement to purchase indi-
vidual mortgages." 8' Permanent became the owner of record on each
note and mortgage, which lends further support to the conclusion
that this was not a public investment offering of securities. The de-
fendant claims that "every single mortgage sent to Permanent was
subject to a right of rejection," and that Permanent rejected a sig-
nificant number of mortgages. 59
The defendant adds an interesting twist to this argument in a
letter appended to its Reply Memorandum, which states that Per-
manent's public expectation was that it was purchasing individual
whole loans, because it treated them that way by individually nego-
tiating them.
0 Decision. The parties in Permanent Savings don't disagree
substantially on the facts. Rather, they disagree on whether to cate-
gorize the sale as one of securities backed by mortgage pools, or one
of many individual mortgages. An analysis of the Reves sub-issues
involved shows where the real disputes are: (1) whether the loan
administration constituted management or just administration; (2)
whether insurance and state and local regulation render sufficient
risk reduction; (3) whether fixed interest constitutes profit; (4)
whether one-to-one negotiation holds sway in the interpretation of
the Reves factors; (5) whether the sophistication of the buyer affects
the outcome; and (6) whether there is a concern about securities law
subsuming real estate law, or vice-versa.
Until the Supreme Court clarifies Reves, these persistent sub-
issues will continue to produce widely inconsistent decisions. 60 But
based on its facts and some of the trends predicted earlier, Perma-
357. Defendant's Reply Memorandiun of Law To Plaintiffs Supplemental
Memorandum of Law at 8, Permanent Say. Bank (No. 86-0713C).
358. Id. at 10.
359. Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Cross-Motion For
Summary Judgment at 4, Permanent Say. Bank (No. 86-0713C).
360. See Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., No. 90 CIV. 5788, 1993 WL 17302
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1993), rev'd, 27 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1994); Deal v. Asset Management
Group, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,244 (N.D. Ill. Aug 28, 1992); Wright v. Downs,
No. 91-2050, 1992 WL 168104 (6th Cir. July 17, 1992); Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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nent should be decided for the defendant. In re National Mortgage,361
a case before Reves concerning similar mortgage notes, held that no
securities were involved because the buyer had an opportunity to
negotiate the origination criteria for the underlying pool. Here,
where the facts indicate that Permanent had an opportunity to and
did negotiate not only the origination criteria but also which indi-
vidual mortgages that it would select, a reliance upon the In re Na-
tional Mortgage holding leads one to the conclusion that these were
individually negotiated whole mortgages and not investment secu-
rities.
Also, because the secondary market instruments involved in
Permanent are whole loans and/or pass-throughs, as opposed to
more exotic, broken down and re-packaged instruments such as col-
lateralized mortgage obligations or stripped securities, there is am-
ple precedent for not finding them to constitute securities.362 Finally,
the federal courts usually decide not to hold the instruments to be
securities when institutions are the buyers, since financial institu-
tions, even thrifts, generally are deemed sophisticated purchasers.
This is especially true of the Second Circuit, given its recent appli-
cation of Reves to the loan participations in Banco Espanol and Pol-
lack.
V. ANALYSIS: THE DYSFUNCTIONAL "FAMILY RESEMBLANCE" TEST
A. The Boundary Between Mortgage and Securities Law
Reves offers insufficient guidance as to when real estate trans-
actions should fall under the ambit of the securities laws. Unless
and until the Supreme Court clarifies its Reves decision, either in
the mortgage/security context or elsewhere, it is certain that mort-
gage/security cases will be decided inconsistently. This lack of judi-
cial consistency derives in part from the courts' hesitancy to bring
largely local real estate laws under the ambit of the federal securiti-
es scheme. Both courts and commentators have expressed concern
about this hesitancy.
Courts also may be hesitant to find that mortgage instruments
are "securities" due to the mortgage note's versatility. A mortgage
note'6 use can range from a minor, single-family acquisition to a
complex development or investment scheme. One commentator has
threatened that if Reves' rebuttable presumption, that all notes are
361. 723 F. Supp. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
362. See First Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp., 834 F.2d
685 (8th Cir. 1987); In re EPIC Mortgage Ins. Litig., 701 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Va. 1988),
affd in part and rev'd in part, Foremost Guar. Corp. v. Meritor Say. Bank, 910 F.2d 118
(4th Cir. 1990); Home Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Third Fin. Servs., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 577 (M.D.
Tenn. 1987).
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securities, were strictly followed, "serious economic dislocation"
would occur.
63
However, the SEC and Congress already have given some indi-
cation that they would prefer greater federal security law protection
for real estate transactions. Specifically, Congress has enacted the
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, which ex-
empts certain private issues of mortgage-backed securities from sec-
urities law registration requirements, but not from securities law
fraud remedies. The SEC has urged enhanced security law protec-
tion in various releases and amicus curiae briefs filed in several
mortgage-security related cases. In order to overcome judicial resis-
tance to such enhanced protection, it may be necessary for Congress
and the SEC to tighten the securities statutes and regulations to
provide a stronger framework for the courts.
B. Whom Is Federal Security Law Designed to Protect?
1. A Federal Security Fraud Remedy. The boundary between
mortgages and "securities" cannot be overlooked. Besides its eco-
nomic implications-considering the enormous growth of the secon-
dary mortgage market and the potential for voluminous litigation
over losses in that market-a basic question of access to federal
court remedies also is implicated.
Plaintiffs decrying fraud perpetrated upon them in the sale of
notes conceivably might bring state common law or statutory secu-
rities fraud claims.3"' But commentators have noted the general ad-
vantages to bringing federal court actions: "better" judges; 65 "fairer"
courts;r 6s and procedural advantages, including wider choice of
venue, world-wide service of process, more liberal joinder, pleading
and discovery, and possibly longer statutes of limitation."6 7 Com-
mentators also have noted specific advantages to federal causes of
action in the securities context: easier elements of proof and relaxed
363. McGinty, supra note 226, at 1033.
364. Perhaps because access to federal courts remains difficult even under Reves'
rebuttable presumption, Congress recently expanded self-regulating agency NASD's
authority to censure dealers of mortgage-backed securities, irrespective of federal fraud
remedies. "The new law enables us to bring an action where misconduct has occurred and
not have to prove fraud," stated John Pinto, VP for Regulation at NASD. See NASD Pre-
pares Fair Practice Rules, MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER, Jan. 31, 1994.
365. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 135 (1985).
366. David J. Bershad & William S. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative
Litigation Involving Public Companies: A Plaintiffs Perspective, in SECURITIES LITI-
GATION 1986, at 33 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5003,
1986).
367. Robert A. Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, The Sale of Business Doctrine: New
Relief From Securities Regulation or a New Haven For Welshers, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 473,
511 n.250 (1983).
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scienter, 68 wider standing to pursue private actions3 9 and greater
receptivity to allowing recovery in cases of first impression."'
2. What Makes An Unsophisticated Investor? At issue is whom
Congress and the courts want to protect. This Comment demon-
strated earlier that in the mortgage/security context, "sophisticated"
financial institutions generally are not being extended federal fraud
protection. Courts rarely find mortgage notes to be securities in such
a context.3
As also discussed earlier, Congress, in passing the Secondary
Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, defined small banks,
thrifts, and credit unions as unsophisticated financial institutions:
... mhe Committee was of the view that small banks, thrifts and credit
unions lacking in financial expertise should be provided additional pro-
tection against risky purchases. Accordingly ... the bill requires the app-
ropriate regulators to consider this question and provide regulations
where necessary governing the size and determination of the purchases
that are authorized. In this way, the bill endeavors to protect the liquidity
of less financially sophisticated institutions on whom many of our citizens
rely for the protection of their savings.
3 7 2
This view is in accordance with that of SEC and state securities
regulators, as well as various self-regulating organizations. 3  How-
ever, the courts rarely see it that way. At least in the mort-
gage/security context, the securities laws rarely are held to apply
when the note purchaser is a financial institution.37 4
The courts might be concerned about the chilling effect of cov-
erage of these transactions under securities fraud statutes. After all,
allowing widespread civil litigation for securities fraud could well
dampen Wall Street's enthusiasm for the secondary mortgage mar-
ket. Congressional and SEC inaction in expanding the definition of
"security" also might be explained in this manner. If significant liti-
368. Id.
369. Lewis D. Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Secu-
rities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891, 892 (1977).
370. Id.
371. For an extensive discussion of how this has long been the outcome across the
board in securities law matters, see C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Un-
der the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 DuKE L.J. 1081.
372. H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984).
373. See supra discussion part I.C.3.
374. See supra notes 355-56 and accompanying text. The federal courts often phrase
their "sophisticated investor" decisions in terms of the buyer's failure to act responsibly,
i.e., caveat emptor, or "buyer beware." See, e.g., In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Pool
Certificates Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 497, 503 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that the sophisti-
cated institutional buyer had a responsibility to look beyond labeling for other indications
of its security status).
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gation losses deterred dealers from selling these notes, the desire to
achieve investor protection would run counter to the concurrent de-
sire to expand the secondary mortgage and asset-backed markets.
The courts may also be concerned that pro-purchaser decisions
will stand tort law on its head. If the unsophisticated investor is
identified by losses sustained in market purchases, then misrepre-
sentation torts soon might drift over into the strict liability or ultra-
hazardous activity categories. The courts might be thinking that it is
better to allow note-purchasing financial institutions to take what-
ever losses they are capable of sustaining than to provide recovery
whenever there is a loss.
In any event, if Congress and the SEC find themselves agreeing
more with Michael Lewis' definition of the sophisticated investor 375
than the federal judiciary's definition, then they will need to make
clearer their collective interpretation, and provide greater federal
securities law protection to institutional note purchasers.
The Second Circuit recently, and the federal courts generally,
have little difficulty holding the "little guy" as a protected, unso-
phisticated investor. However, when applied to thrifts, that charac-
terization is troubling because thifts are popularly characterized as
criminal. Real estate developers, for example, have owned S&Ls and
siphoned off fumds. 6 Indeed, a 1988 House Government Operations
Committee report found that fraud and misconduct played a role in
three-quarters of all S&L failures.3 77
Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress and the SEC often see
large financial institutions as unsophisticated investors,378 while
courts in the mortgage/security context rarely do. Perhaps it is time
for the courts to begin extending federal securities law fraud protec-
tion to unsophisticated thrifts.
375. In the 1980s, the S&L executive trading in mortgage-securities was an
unsophisticated investor, the "fool in the market." LEWIS, supra note 7, at 114. However,
even Lewis points out that these transactions were between consenting adults, "the thrift
managers forgetting that age-old caveat, 'buyer beware'." Id. at 105.
376. See MAYER, BANK ROBBERY, supra note 22, at 171.
377. ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 184.
378. See, e.g., House Seeks Fair Practice Rules For Government Mortgage-Backed
Securities, MORTGAGE-BACKED SEC. LETTER, Oct. 19, 1992; RTC Chronicles Widespread
Securities Speculation By Thrifts in Congressional Report, RTC WATCH, Mar. 30, 1992, at
3 (reporting statement of House Finance Subcommittee Senior Policy Analyst that an
S&L executive "might manage a lot of money, but still not be a sophisticated investor").
Congress also sought to protect municipalities after West Virginia, San Jose and various
Ohio cities lost millions of dollars in government securities, including mortgage-backed
securities such as IOs. Id.; see also Government Sponsored Enterprises Respond To De-
rivatives Crash, INT'L BANKACCT., Nov. 15, 1993, at 3.
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C. Intent to Protect Unsophisticated Investors is Clear, But
Execution is Ineffective
1. Clear Intent. Congress, the SEC and the Supreme Court
agree in their mutual desire to protect the unsophisticated investor
however such an entity is defined. In 1990 the SEC adopted Rule
144A, which allows large, sophisticated Qualified Institutional Buy-
ers, or QIBs, to trade private placements among themselvesY7 9
Similarly, the Supreme Court has indicated that the 1933 Securities
Act was designed to protect individual investors, not sophisticated
institutions. 80
2. Healing the Dysfunctional "Family Resemblance" Test. In Re-
yes, the Supreme Court expressed its clear intention in note cases: to
allow plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption that the note in question is
a security. While the Court's expressed intent is crystal clear, the
"family resemblance" test to be employed in effecting this intent is
muddy. In a word, the "family resemblance" test is dysfunctional.
This Comment urges the Supreme Court to clear the waters
and heal this dysfunctional test by accepting another note case,
preferably a mortgage note case, and doing the following:
1) Answer the commentators, and the courts below, as to how the Reves
four-factor analysis is to be applied. Must all four factors be met, is a bal-
ancing required, or do some factors have greater weight than others?
2) Resolve the inconsistencies among the Reves sub-issues implicated in
the note cases. Provide guidance on "note as security" questions of: loan
administration; available types of risk reduction (are state/local mortgage
law remedies sufficient?); interest as profit; concerns regarding real estate
law's subsumption; instrument labeling (does it matter that the instru-
ment says "security"?); opportunities to negotiate; the scope of the excep-
tions for "note secured by a mortgage on a home" and "commercial loans";
duration of the loan; buyer's sophistication, or lack thereof; and when fi-
nancial institutions are entitled to federal securities law fraud protection.
CONCLUSION
It is by no means certain that Reves will sweep the secondary
mortgage market further under the ambit of the federal securities
laws; in fact, there are indications that Reves' ultimate effect may be
just the opposite. The application of inconsistent tests to determine
whether mortgage-related instruments constitute securities under
the federal laws, both before and after the Supreme Court's Reves
379. See Mark S. Carey, et al., Recent Developments in the Market for Privately
Placed Debt, FED. RESERVE BULL., Feb. 1993, at 77.
380. See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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decision; an ongoing pattern of dilution of the "family resemblance"
test, particularly in the Second Circuit, where it was originally cre-
ated but now hinges on the sub-issue of buyer sophistication; and,
the significant differences in outlook between the courts and the
administrative and legislative branches as to who is an unsophisti-
cated investor; all lead to the conclusion that mortgage/securities
law will continue to be business as usual, decided by whim rather
than reason.
However, agreement between the Supreme Court, Congress
and the SEC about the intent to maintain availability of a federal
remedy for fraud in the sale and/or purchase of securities leads to
the hope that mortgage/security law will not be business as usual.
Rather, one can hope that the law will evolve as the Supreme Court
comes to recognize deficiencies in the "family resemblance" test and
seeks to heal them.
Unless the Supreme Court revises its dysfunctional "family re-
semblance" test, mortgage-related instruments will more consis-
tently be held to be under the federal securities laws' umbrella of
protection only if Congress and the SEC act to make it so. Family
law requires specific, predictable tests to determine "family resem-
blance," i.e., parentage.38 1 There is no reason why tests for family re-
semblance in securities law cannot be as exactingly and consistently
applied.
381. See, e.g., Joan C. Sylvain, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of
Paternity, 39 CATH. L. REV. 831, 831-32 n.1 (1990) (stating that paternity determination
using DNA markers has 98.07% accuracy rate). Cf D.H. Kaye, The Probability of an Ul-
timate Issue: The Strange Cases of Paternity Testing, 75 IOWA L. REV. 75, 75 n.1 (1989)
(arguing that "direct evidentiary applications of the mathematics of probability to resolve
conflicting factual claims in litigation" sparks spirited academic debate).
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